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THE ANOMALY OF ENTRAPMENT 
JESSICA A. ROTH

 
ABSTRACT 
Now in our second decade after 9/11, we are firmly in the prevention 
era of law enforcement. Faced with the unacceptable consequences of 
identifying threats too late, government agents are moving aggressively to 
identify potential terrorists before they strike. Undercover agents and 
confidential informants necessarily play a large role in such efforts. As a 
result of such operations, we have seen a number of cases brought to trial 
in the federal courts in which defendants have asserted the entrapment 
defense. To date, the defense has not succeeded. However, as a 
consequence of these cases, the United States Supreme Court may be 
required to reconsider the defense for the first time in over twenty years. 
Thus, now is a good time to re-examine the entrapment defense that the 
Supreme Court first recognized eighty years ago. This Article argues that 
the federal entrapment defense represents a doctrinal anomaly that 
straddles the line between criminal procedure and criminal substance. 
Understanding how and why the entrapment defense evolved as it did may 
engender greater sympathy for this much-maligned corner of the criminal 
law. It could also lead to reforms in the way the defense is administered 
that would better serve the interests that animate the defense—some 
sounding in the traditional concerns of substantive criminal law 
(culpability and dangerousness) and others in the traditional concerns of 
criminal procedure (deterring overzealous and unwarranted intrusions by 
government agents). 
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I do believe that on the present course, there will come a tipping 
point . . . such that al Qaeda as we know it . . . has been effectively 
destroyed. At that point, we must be able to say to ourselves that our 
efforts should no longer be considered an “armed conflict” against 
al Qaeda and its associated forces; rather a counterterrorism effort 
against individuals . . . for which the law enforcement and 
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intelligence resources of our government are principally 
responsible . . . .
1
 
There isn’t a business of terrorism in the United States . . . . You’re 
not going to be able to go to a street corner and find someone who’s 
already blown something up . . . . [T]he . . . goal is not to find 
somebody who’s already engaged in terrorism but find somebody 
who would jump at the opportunity if a real terrorist showed up in 
town.
2
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the post-9/11 world, government agents are under tremendous 
pressure to find terrorists before they strike. The consequences of allowing 
terrorists to succeed are simply unacceptable. As part of a comprehensive 
prevention strategy,
3
 law enforcement agents have devoted considerable 
resources to undercover operations aimed at identifying potential 
terrorists. Although undercover operations have long comprised an 
important part of law enforcement agents’ toolkit, post 9/11, the goals and 
methods of such undercover operations—as applied in the anti-terrorism 
context—have appreciably shifted. Instead of seeking solely to identify 
individuals who are actively engaged in criminal conduct, now agents also 
have deliberately sought to identify individuals who might be willing to 
aid acts of terrorism, even if they are not currently involved in such 
activities. As one former F.B.I. agent told the New York Times, “[p]rior to 
9/11 it would [have been] very unusual for the F.B.I. to present a crime 
 
 
 1. Jeh Johnson, former Gen. Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t of Def., Speech at the Oxford Union, 
Oxford University (Nov. 30, 2012). On Dec. 23, 2013, Johnson was sworn in as Secretary of the U.S. 
Dep’t of Homeland Security.  
 2. David K. Shipler, Terrorist Plots, Hatched by the F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2012, at SR4 
(quoting David Raskin, former federal terrorism prosecutor). 
 3. See John C. Richter, Counter-Terrorism: A Federal Prosecutor’s View, 33 OKLA. CITY U. L. 
REV. 297, 306–07 (2008) (“Following the September 11 attacks, it became clear that this country, and 
the Department of Justice specifically, had to implement changes to better protect us from 
attack. . . . [T]he Department developed what it called a prevention strategy to combat terrorist 
threats.”); Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of 
Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 429 (2007) (“It has been clear for some time that the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has made the prevention of terrorist attacks a top strategic priority, and 
thus will intervene before an attack occurs whenever it is possible to do so.”); David J. Gottfried, 
Avoiding the Entrapment Defense in a Post-9/11 World, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Jan. 2012, at 
25, 26, available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/january-
2012 (“In the aftermath of 9/11, it no longer proves sufficient to solve crimes after people have 
committed them. . . . The American people expect federal, state, and local law enforcement officers to 
proactively prevent another terrorist attack . . . . ”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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opportunity that wasn’t in the scope of the activities that a person was 
already involved in . . . .”4 Suspects would be solicited to commit crimes 
of the same type that they were already suspected of having committed.
5
 
But in the new world order, as one former terrorism prosecutor recounted, 
the “goal . . . is not ‘to find somebody who’s already engaged in terrorism 
but find somebody who would jump at the opportunity if a real terrorist 
showed up in town.’”6 The notion, in effect, is that law enforcement and 
the real terrorists are competing to find those who would be willing to join 
the terrorist cause. If government agents find those individuals first, they 
will be unavailable to assist the real terrorists.  
Simply being willing to commit a crime, however, traditionally is not a 
sufficient basis upon which to impose criminal liability. Generally 
speaking, our criminal laws require an act accompanied by a guilty mind.
7
 
Our laws prohibiting criminal attempts and criminal conspiracies move up 
the point in time at which criminal liability will attach, on the theory that 
the attempt—usually defined as taking a substantial step toward 
commission of the underlying crime
8—or the agreement to commit the 
crime
9
 satisfy the act requirement. If accompanied by the requisite 
culpable mental state, or mens rea, the attempt or agreement suffices. The 
very purpose of recognizing such inchoate offenses is to permit law 
enforcement to intervene earlier, without risking the social harm that 
would result from allowing the criminal plan to proceed further.
10
 But 
what if the attempt or conspiracy is the product of a law enforcement 
sting? Does the involvement of law enforcement agents provide a defense? 
The answer that American criminal law has settled on, over the past 
eighty-plus years, generally is “no.” Undercover operations are recognized 
as permissible and often necessary tools of law enforcement, and the fact 
that undercover government agents were involved in the offense is not per 
se a bar to conviction for a criminal caught in the sting. However, 
 
 
 4. Shipler, supra note 2 (quoting Mike German, former F.B.I. agent).  
 5. See id. 
 6. Id. (quoting a former terrorism prosecutor). 
 7. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 9.01 (6th ed. 2012). 
 8. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (Official Draft 1962) (setting forth the 
“substantial step” formulation); DRESSLER, supra note 7, § 27.06 (reviewing the actus reus of attempt 
formulations in various jurisdictions). Most federal courts have embraced the substantial step test for 
the actus reas of attempt. See Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 349 (1991) (attempt requires 
proof of a substantial step); United States v. Redd, 355 F.3d 866, 873 (5th Cir. 2003) (same); Pascual 
v. Holder, 723 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2013) (same); United States v. Evans, 699 F.3d 858, 867 (6th 
Cir. 2012) (same). 
 9. See DRESSLER, supra note 7, § 29.04. 
 10. See id. § 29.02. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/4
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American law has carved out a limited defense, entrapment, whereby the 
involvement of government agents will provide a basis for an acquittal. 
 The entrapment doctrine, as applied in federal court and in most states, 
involves two elements—inducement and predisposition. The defendant 
bears the burden of persuasion as to the first element.
11
 Thus, a defendant 
asserting entrapment must show that he or she was induced to commit the 
offense by an (undercover)
12
 government agent.
13
 If inducement has been 
shown, the burden shifts to the government to show that the defendant 
nevertheless was “predisposed” to commit the offense.14 In other words, if 
the government can establish that the defendant was predisposed to 
commit similar offenses before being induced by a government agent to 
commit the offense charged in the particular case, the entrapment defense 
fails. Like other defenses, entrapment is categorized as a matter of 
substantive criminal law and is submitted to juries for decision.
15
  
Perhaps not surprisingly, as law enforcement agents have devoted more 
resources to undercover terrorism investigations, we have seen some 
 
 
 11. PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE §§ 4.04 (4th ed. 2009). 
 12. The undercover nature of the government agent’s involvement distinguishes such cases from 
the different situation in which defendants sometimes raise the defense of “entrapment by estoppel.” 
Although both defenses share the word “entrapment” they actually mean very different things. 
Entrapment by estoppel is premised on the notion that a defendant has been misled by a government 
agent, apparently acting in an official capacity, into believing that the conduct the defendant thereafter 
engages in is lawful. In such a situation, the defendant’s mens rea is lacking, because he or she 
reasonably may have believed the conduct to be lawful. See United States v. Baker, 438 F.3d 749, 753 
(7th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Neville, 82 F.3d 750, 761 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The entrapment 
by estoppel defense applies ‘when, acting with actual or apparent authority, a government official 
affirmatively assures the defendant that certain conduct is legal and the defendant reasonably believes 
that official.’”). Another related, but again different, defense is what is known as the “public authority” 
defense. A defendant asserting a public authority defense asserts that he or she was led to believe by a 
government agent, acting in an official capacity, that the defendant was authorized to engage in 
conduct that would otherwise be unlawful, as part of an undercover operation. See Elizabeth E. Joh, 
Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in Crime, 62 STAN. L. REV. 155, 
169–71 (2009) (explaining public authority defense). Again, in such a situation, the defendant would 
not possess the requisite mens rea for the offense. The entrapment defense that is the subject of this 
Article is that which applies when a defendant does not know he or she is dealing with a government 
agent, or—as in rare cases where a government agent poses as a corrupt government agent—does not 
know that the government agent is acting.  
 13. There is general agreement in the courts applying the subjective test today that “inducement” 
requires more than merely furnishing a defendant with an opportunity to commit a crime or soliciting 
him to commit a crime. See MARCUS, supra note 11, §§ 2.03A, 6.02. Inducement requires “further 
overreaching” by the government, in the nature of some kind of above-market offer, appeal to 
sympathy or personal relationships, or repeated solicitation amounting to harassment. See id. §§ 4.04, 
6.02.  
 14. MARCUS, supra note 11, §§ 4.04, 6.02. 
 15. Id. § 6.05. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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notable assertions of the entrapment defense,
16
 albeit as a defense of last 
resort.
17
 This is also true in cases involving child enticement over the 
Internet,
18
 another law enforcement priority of recent years,
19
 in the pursuit 
 
 
 16. See, e.g., United States v. Amawi, 695 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2012) (defendant convicted of 
conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists), cert. denied sub nom. Amawi v. United States, 
133 S. Ct. 1474 (2013); United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2011) (defendant convicted 
of conspiring to kill U.S. officers, acquiring and exporting anti-aircraft missiles, and proving material 
support to a known terrorist organization), cert. denied sub nom. Al Kassar v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 
2374 (2012); United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085 (defendant convicted of conspiring to provide 
material support to terrorist organizations), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied by 452 F. App’x 943 (11th 
Cir. 2011), and cert. denied sub nom. Jayyousi v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 29 (2012); United States v. 
Farhane, 634 F.3d 127 (2d Cir.) (defendant convicted of providing material support to terrorist 
organization), cert. denied sub nom. Sabir v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 833 (2011); United States v. 
McDavid, 396 F. App’x 365 (9th Cir. 2010) (defendant convicted of conspiring to bomb various 
targets in U.S.), cert. denied sub nom. McDavid v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2469 (2011); United 
States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2008) (defendants convicted of conspiring and attempting 
to provide material support to terrorist organizations); United States v. Aref, 285 F. App’x 784 (2d Cir. 
2008) (defendants convicted of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorist organizations), cert. 
denied sub nom. Aref v. United States, 556 U.S. 1107 (2009); United States v. Bout, No. 08 Cr. 
365(SAS), 2011 WL 2693720 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2011) (defendant convicted of conspiracy to provide 
material support to terrorist organization, kill United States nationals, and acquire antiaircraft missiles) 
aff’d, 731 F.3d 233 (2013); United States v. Cromitie, No. 09 CR 558(CM), 2011 WL 2693297 
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2011) (defendants convicted of conspiring to destroy a Bronx synagogue and 
military aircraft at a National Guard base in Newburgh), aff’d, 727 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2013); United 
States v. al Ghazi, No. S3 07 CR 354(JSR), 2009 WL 1605741 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2009) (defendant 
convicted of conspiring to purchase anti-aircraft missiles and provide funds to terrorist organizations); 
United States v. El-Hindi, No. 3:06CR719, 2009 WL 1373270 (N.D. Ohio May 15, 2009), aff’d sub 
nom. United States v. Amawi, 695 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2012), and cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1474 (2013). 
For additional cases addressing claims of entrapment in the terrorism context, see Dru Stevenson, 
Effect of the National Security Paradigm on Criminal Law, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 160–62 
nn. 199–200 & 206 (2011) (collecting cases), and Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and Terrorism, 49 B.C. 
L. REV. 125, 125–26 n.1 (2008) (same). 
 17. Although rarely supported by empirical data, the “convention wisdom is that [entrapment] is 
rarely raised and that it rarely succeeds . . . .” Dru Stevenson, Entrapment by Numbers, 16 U. FLA. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 1, 15–16 & n.36 (2005) (collecting authorities citing the defense’s rare successes). See 
also Joh, supra note 12, at 172–73; Collecting data on the frequency with which the defense is 
successful is particularly difficult. Among other reasons, double jeopardy principles preclude the 
government from appealing an acquittal. Therefore, the reported cases do not include cases where a 
defendant was acquitted on the basis of entrapment. See Stevenson, supra, at 15. Moreover, the 
practice of asking juries to return a general verdict obscures whether an acquittal was based on a 
finding of entrapment or another basis such as insufficiency of the evidence as to the charge more 
generally. However, by all accounts of interested observers, the defense has not prevailed in a single 
terrorism case since 9/11. See CTR. ON LAW & SEC., TEN YEARS LATER: TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT 
CARD: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001–SEPTEMBER 11, 2011 26 (2011); Wadie E. Said, The Terrorist Informant, 
85 WASH. L. REV. 687, 711 (2010). See also Francesca Laguardia, Terrorists, Informants, and 
Buffoons: The Case for Downward Departure As a Response to Entrapment, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 171, 205 & n.174 (2013) (reporting that a search of news reports revealed “95 successful 
acquittals based on an entrapment defense, over 80 cases, in 20 years, only 20 of which involved any 
level of violence”).  
 18. See, e.g., United States v. Shinn, 681 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Hackworth, 
483 F. App’x 972 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Hackworth v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 841 
(2013); United States v. Helton, 480 F. App’x 846 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Helton v. United 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/4
  
 
 
 
 
2014] THE ANOMALY OF ENTRAPMENT 985 
  
 
 
 
of which savvy law enforcement agents have leveraged their ability to 
catch would-be child sex abusers by posing as underage victims online. In 
both contexts, it is critically important that our criminal justice system sort 
those who likely would engage in such crimes absent the intervention of 
law enforcement agents from those who would not. Absent appropriate 
sorting, we waste scarce resources investigating, trying and potentially 
confining those who do not present a real threat.
20
 We also run a 
significant risk of undermining the public’s respect for the criminal justice 
system,
21
 with a particular risk of alienating communities whose ongoing 
 
 
States, 133 S. Ct. 562 (2012); United States v. Cooke, 675 F.3d 1153 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Herbst, 666 F.3d 504 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Schuttpelz, 467 F. App’x 349 (6th Cir. 2012), 
cert. denied sub nom. Schuttpelz v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2366 (2013); United States v. Dávila-
Nieves 670 F. 3d 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Dávila-Nieves v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2407 
(2012); United States v. Knope, 655 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. Knope v. United 
States, 132 S. Ct. 1060 (2012); United States v. Leightey, 432 F. App’x 836 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 
sub nom. Leightey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 534 (2011); United States v. Douglas, 415 F. App’x 271 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Douglas v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1024 (2011); United States v. 
Abarca, 402 F. App’x 494 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Godwin, 399 F. App’x 484 (11th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Orr, 622 F.3d 864 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. Orr v. United States, 
131 S. Ct. 2889 (2011); United States v. Young, 613 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom. 
Young v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 962 (2011); United States v. Al-Cholan, 610 F. 3d 945 (6th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Ross, 379 F. App’x 683 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Gates, 351 F. App’x 
362 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Myers, 575 F. 3d 801 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Chaudhry, 321 F. App’x 119 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Chaudhry v. United States, 558 U.S. 924 
(2009), mandamus denied sub nom. In re Chaudhry, 441 F. App’x 955 (3d Cir.), and post-conviction 
relief denied sub nom. Chaudhry v. United States, No. 10-3119(FSH), 2011 WL 4729010 (D. N.J. Oct. 
5, 2011); United States v. Duke, No. 4:07-cr-65-RH-GRJ, 2013 WL 336719 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2013); 
United States v. Ziolkowski, No. 1:12cr12-SPM, 2012 WL 5944271 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 28, 2012); United 
States v. One 2007 Toyota FJ Cruiser, VIN JTEBU11F670023522, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (N.D. Ga. 
2011); United States v. Montgomery, Nos. 07-CR-122-GKF, 08-CV-687-GKF-TLW, 2010 WL 
1486941 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 12, 2010); United States v. Mikoloyck, No. 09-00036-01-CR-W-GAF, 2009 
WL 4798900 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 7, 2009); United States v. Doerr, No. 09-00031-01-CR-W-FJG, 2009 
WL 4042759 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 20, 2009); United States v. Young, No. 3:08-cr-00122-JAJ, 2009 WL 
1383791 (S.D. Iowa May 13, 2009); United States v. Yakoob, No. 07-20084, 2009 WL 270161 (E.D. 
Mich. Feb. 3, 2009).  
 19. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD EXPLOITATION 
PREVENTION AND INTERDICTION, A REPORT TO CONGRESS (Aug. 2010) (explaining the Department of 
Justice’s strategy to combat and prevent child sexual exploitation, as required by the Providing 
Resources, Officers, and Technology to Eradicate Cyber Threats to Our Children Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-401, 122 Stat. 4229 (2008)). 
 20. The waste of scarce police resources has long been a primary concern of many critics of 
entrapment. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Political Economy of Entrapment, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 107, 114 (2005) (“absent regulation, police will use undercover operations wastefully, 
diverting resources from better uses”); United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(Posner, J., concurring) (arguing that one of the purposes of the entrapment defense is to discourage 
police from wasting scarce resources generating crime that otherwise not occur). 
 21. See, e.g., Shipler, supra note 2 (questioning the legitimacy of law enforcement tactics in 
terrorism stings); Andrew F. March, A Dangerous Mind?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012, at SR1 
(questioning the legitimacy of a material support conviction of a Pittsburgh-born pharmacist, 
observing “I don’t trust prosecutors with [the] jurisdiction [to decide ‘the differences between the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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cooperation with law enforcement is critical.
22
 Moreover, given the types 
of statutes typically used in the anticipatory prosecution of terrorism,
23
 
which are among the most inchoate of offenses to begin with,
24
 if we fail 
to take seriously the need to engage in this sorting, then our criminal 
justice system runs the risk of unacceptably bleeding into a system of 
preventive detention.
25
 Ideally, law enforcement agencies, working in 
 
 
thoughts in our heads and the feelings in our hearts’”]); CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, 
TARGETED AND ENTRAPPED: MANUFACTURING THE “HOMEGROWN THREAT” IN THE UNITED STATES 
39 (2011) (arguing that the FBI’s use of informants in terrorism stings “raise serious concerns about 
the U.S. government’s compliance with its international human rights obligations,” including its 
obligations pursuant to various international treaties to guarantee, among other rights, the right to “a 
fair trial, non-discrimination, and freedom of expression and religion”). 
 22. See Said, supra note 17, at 735 (“Unfortunately, important segments of the Muslim 
community in the United States feel alienated already and their future cooperation with the FBI is in 
jeopardy.”); David A. Harris, Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering in Muslim and Immigrant 
Communities After 9/11, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123, 130 (2010) (warning of the dangers 
to the FBI’s relationship with Muslim communities if it uses “informants in Muslim religious and 
cultural contexts too frequently and casually”). See also Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy 
and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 231, 264 (2008) (concluding that the public is more likely to cooperate with law enforcement 
efforts if “the police strive to exercise their authority in ways that members of the public evaluate as 
fair”). 
 23. The majority of the federal prosecutions brought against would-be terrorists in recent years 
have been brought under the attempt and conspiracy provisions of the statute criminalizing the 
provision of material support to a terrorist organization, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Supp. IV 2011). See CTR. 
ON LAW & SEC., supra note 17 (collecting information on the approximately 300 terrorism-related 
prosecutions from 2001 to 2011 and observing that, since 2009, the material support charge contained 
in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B is the most commonly charged, followed by the material support for terrorists 
charge contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (Supp. IV 2011), which was enacted in 1994). Section 2339B 
was enacted in 1996 as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, “in the 
midst of growing concern about the problem of terrorism,” with its passage “helped considerably by 
the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.” Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the 
Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1102 (2008). The 
material support statute requires proof that the defendant knowingly provided support to an 
organization that the United States Secretary of State has designated as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization (FTO). The government need not show that the defendant intended to further the terrorist 
activities of the organization, only that the defendant either knew of the organization’s designation as 
an FTO or that it previously had engaged in, or was presently engaged in, terrorist activities. See 18 
U.S.C. § 2339B. The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 2339B against a 
vagueness and First Amendment challenge in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project. See Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).  
 24. For an excellent discussion of the way that terrorism stings often result in “stacked inchoate 
offenses”—in that a defendant may be convicted of “acts taken in preparation of a conspiracy,” see Jon 
Sherman, “A Person Otherwise Innocent”: Policing Entrapment in Preventative, Undercover 
Counterterrorism Investigations, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1475, 1485 (2009). On the unique and 
potentially troubling aspects of material support laws in the sense of their departure from our usual 
notions of criminal wrongdoing, see David Cole, Terror Financing, Guilt by Association and the 
Paradigm of Prevention in the ‘War on Terror,’ in COUNTERTERRORISM: DEMOCRACY’S CHALLENGE 
233 (Andrea Bianchi & Alexis Keller eds., 2008). 
 25. See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 23, at 1081 (noting the convergence between the 
criminal justice system and the military detention model for dealing with suspected terrorists, as the 
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tandem with prosecutors, would do this sorting ex ante, before 
commencing or continuing an investigation or, at the very latest, before 
commencing a prosecution—and there are strong institutional incentives 
for agents and prosecutors to do so.
26
 But such incentives are not perfect.
27
  
Because the entrapment defense is the primary mechanism that the 
judicial system has developed for policing undercover operations,
28
 it is 
important that the defense have bite. And yet the conventional wisdom is 
that the entrapment defense is quite toothless. This is a good time, then, 
for a reassessment. This Article argues that entrapment has been weakened 
by its continued categorization as a matter of substantive criminal law, 
 
 
“criminal justice system has diminished some traditional procedural safeguards in terrorism trials and 
has quietly established the capacity for convicting terrorists based on criteria that come close to 
associational status”). See Stevenson, Effect of the National Security Paradigm, supra note 16, at 137 
(“[W]e are witnessing a shift toward focusing on incapacitation and prevention of crime rather than 
traditional deterrence or retribution.”); see also David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, 
Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (2009) (arguing in favor of a national discussion 
and legislation authorizing a system of preventive detention subject to explicit criteria); Paul H. 
Robinson, Commentary, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as Criminal 
Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429 (2001) (discussing the need to keep our criminal justice and 
preventive detention systems distinct). 
 26. See Louis Michael Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice 
Dilemma, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 144 (observing that “one would expect the police themselves to be 
motivated to use scarce resources in a manner that maximizes the number of criminals apprehended”). 
 27. See id. at 144 n.127 (observing that some officers may be more motivated to make arrests, 
and less concerned about whether such arrests lead to convictions, because their career advancement is 
determined by the former but not the latter); Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and the Problem of Deterring 
Police Misconduct, 37 CONN. L. REV. 67, 120 (2004) (same). Even those officers and prosecutors who 
care about convictions may have some difficulty objectively analyzing whether a defendant was 
entrapped if they have already expended significant resources on the investigation. See Laguardia, 
supra note 17, at 201 (discussing the pressures on law enforcement agencies post 9/11 to convict 
terrorists and the tremendous resources devoted to terrorism sting investigations). All of these factors 
may exacerbate what some social science studies have found to be the greater “punishment preferring” 
tendencies of those who seek out law enforcement jobs—i.e., a tendency to perceive culpability where 
an average person would not. See Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Punitive Police? Agency Costs, Law 
Enforcement, and Criminal Procedure (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 644 
(2d series), 2013), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/644-rma-punitive.pdf 
(suggesting that those attracted to law enforcement jobs, including policing and prosecution, will be 
more “punishment-preferring” than the average citizen and therefore will be more likely than would 
the average citizen to see a reason to punish a particular individual in a particular set of 
circumstances).  
 28. See McAdams, supra note 20, at 115 (noting that although “[a] few other doctrines 
marginally affect undercover operations . . . entrapment is the main event”) (footnote omitted); 
Jacqueline E. Ross, Tradeoffs in Undercover Investigations: A Comparative Perspective, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1501, 1527 (2002) (Unlike in Europe, where undercover operations are regulated directly, 
“Americans treat the entrapment defense as a sufficient legal constraint on undercover conduct.”); see 
also Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 592 (2009) 
(explaining that, while undercover operations are not regulated ex ante, entrapment doctrine regulates 
undercover operations ex post by giving the jury a basis upon which to acquit a defendant if it finds 
that the police practices abusive). 
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without sufficiently accounting for the extent to which it shares the 
concerns of criminal procedure—namely, the rules governing the 
collection of evidence by law enforcement agents and the process of 
prosecution.
29
 Entrapment’s categorization as a matter of substantive 
criminal law is responsible for many of the aspects of entrapment doctrine 
that are unsatisfying as a theoretical matter, including why, if it is an 
affirmative defense grounded in the actor’s lack of culpability,30 it is 
available only when a defendant is induced to commit an offense by a 
governmental actor. It may also help explain why the defense is so rarely 
successful, in that it tasks the criminal jury with a determination that the 
jury may not be particularly well-suited to make given the current 
allocation of decision-making between judges and juries in our criminal 
justice system overall. Taking entrapment’s procedural traits into account 
could help courts administer the defense more effectively, by, among other 
things, providing the space for an initial pre-trial ruling by judges on 
claims of entrapment. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I shows how 
entrapment wound up in the criminal substance category by historical 
happenstance, on account of the timing of when the United States 
Supreme Court first considered the defense, before the Warren Court’s 
revolution in criminal procedure. It analyzes the foundational decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court in Sorrells v. United States,
31
 and 
Sherman v. United States,
32
 which created the modern defense of 
entrapment. This part shows how the way in which the Court framed 
entrapment in these cases was attributable mainly to the primary dilemma 
 
 
 29. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal 
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (1997) (explaining that the rules of criminal procedure “are really the 
system’s rules, rules that regulate the conduct of the various actors who take part in the process by 
which some criminal defendants are convicted and punished”). Of course, the line between procedure 
and substance can in some cases be elusive. See Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of 
Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801, 816 (2010) (“The assumption that categories of substance 
and procedure are mutually exclusive and exhaustive simply seems to defy reality.”); D. Michael 
Risinger, “Substance” and “Procedure” Revisited with Some Afterthoughts on the Constitutional 
Problems of “Irrebutable Presumptions,” 30 UCLA L. REV. 189, 189 (1982) (“One would think that, 
considering the commonness of the distinction and its practical impact in many actual cases, there 
would have emerged some consensus about what constitutes procedure and what constitutes 
substance.”).  
 30. See Jonathan C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment 
Defense, 73 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1019 (1987) (noting that an entrapped defendant “lacks culpability is 
simply indefensible under the criminal law’s traditional methods of assessing culpability” because that 
individual has committed a criminal act with the requisite mental state, and the police involvement is 
insufficient to afford a defense of duress). 
 31. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).  
 32. 356 U.S. 369 (1958). 
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that the Court faced in recognizing the defense at all—namely, it had to 
locate a source of its authority for doing so. Because of the way in which 
the Court resolved this dilemma (it divined in the statutes pursuant to 
which the defendants were convicted a Congressional intent to exclude 
from the statutes’ coverage those who were the victims of entrapment) 
certain other consequences flowed—although with fairly little analysis—
including that entrapment would be treated as a substantive law question 
and submitted to the jury. This part demonstrates that, when the Court first 
established the doctrinal framework for the defense, there was no 
precedent for the Court to view entrapment as raising an issue of criminal 
procedure or evidence law. 
 Part II analyzes developments in constitutional criminal procedure and 
the exclusionary rule for evidence obtained in violation of defendants’ 
constitutional rights in the era that followed. In the 1960s, the Court 
incorporated most of the Bill of Rights to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and expanded the 
exclusionary rules of evidence as part of that process. The Court did not, 
however, revisit entrapment during that period. In the next two decades, 
the 1970s and 1980s, the Court returned to entrapment in a pair of cases, 
but by then it was too late. The Warren Court was over and the 
exclusionary rule was in retreat. The window for the Court to recast 
entrapment as a candidate for application of the exclusionary rule had 
closed. But in the process of first expanding and then chipping away at the 
exclusionary rule, the Court created a large body of jurisprudence that, in 
terms of its animating concerns and its mode of analysis, is very similar to 
the predisposition test for entrapment that the Court articulated in Sorrells 
and Sherman. It was in this era that the truly anomalous nature of 
entrapment was set: although the defense was still nominally a substantive 
defense, it now shared many characteristics of doctrines arising out of the 
courts’ criminal procedure docket.  
Part III analyzes the Court’s sole entrapment case from the 1990s to the 
present, Jacobson v. United States,
33
 and recent developments in the 
Circuit Courts of Appeals. Jacobson largely left the Court’s entrapment 
doctrine intact but added refinements that brought the defense into the 
modern era—most notably requiring (in the context of long-term 
undercover operations) that the government prove a defendant’s 
predisposition at the point at which government contact with the defendant 
began. Part IV explores the practical consequences of taking into account 
 
 
 33. 503 U.S. 540 (1992). 
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entrapment’s criminal procedure characteristics, particularly as applied to 
today’s long-term sting operations.  
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE  
A. Beginnings 
The concept of “entrapment” as a legal defense emerged in the United 
States at the end of the 19th century.
34
 Until recently, it was only an 
American concept—it had no roots in the English common law or 
analogue in the law of other nations.
35
 The doctrine dates back to the post-
Civil War period when America’s urban populations grew, and along with 
them, criminal syndicates. At the same time, law enforcement went 
through a period of growth and professionalization, with the state and 
federal governments pouring unprecedented resources into the 
investigation and prosecution of crime. New federal laws like the 
Prohibition Act, the Narcotics Act, and other laws aimed at “vice” crimes 
like obscenity and prostitution gave the new law enforcement agents, 
especially federal agents, many tools to use and seemingly unlimited 
potential targets.
36
 Undercover techniques became particularly important. 
Taken altogether, these developments caused courts to grow concerned 
 
 
 34. See generally Rebecca Roiphe, The Serpent Beguiled Me: A History of the Entrapment 
Defense, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 257, 271 (2003) (“No state or federal court recognized entrapment 
as a valid defense prior to 1870.”). Prior to end of the nineteenth century, “most state courts would not 
excuse the defendant merely because the detective initiated, induced, or precipitated the events if the 
prosecution could prove that all the formal elements of the crime were present.” Id. at 272; see also 
MARCUS, supra note 11, §§ 1.01–03; McAdams, supra note 20, at 110–11; Lester B. Orfield, The 
Defense of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1967 DUKE L.J. 39; Seidman, supra note 26. 
 35. See MARCUS, supra note 11 § 1.03; Stevenson, Effect of the National Security Paradigm, 
supra note 16, at 146–47; Kent Roach, Entrapment and Equality in Terrorism Prosecutions: A 
Comparative Examination of North American and European Approaches, 80 MISS. L.J. 1455, 1455 
(2011) (explaining the fairly recent adoption of variations on the entrapment defense in Canada and 
various European jurisdictions, declaring that “[t]he entrapment defense is no longer peculiarly 
American”). See also Ross, supra note 28, at 1521 (describing the different approach taken to 
undercover policing in Western Europe, where police involvement in a crime traditionally “fails to 
excuse the target but implicates the investigator in the crime”). 
 36. As Sara Sun Beale has recounted, between 1901 and 1932 the number of federal prosecutions 
increased five-fold, due largely to Prohibition, the Mann Act, and the Harrison Narcotics Act. Sara Sun 
Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on 
the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1441 n.48 (1984) (citing Edward Rubin, 
A Statistical Study of Federal Criminal Prosecutions, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 494, 497 (1934)). 
See also Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds–The Center 
Doesn’t, 117 YALE L.J. 1374, 1397–98 (2008) (discussing the effect of Prohibition on federal 
prosecutions); Robert Post, Federalism, Positive Law, and the Emergence of the American 
Administrative State: Prohibition in the Taft Court Era, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2006); Roiphe, 
supra note 34, at 258. 
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about abuses of power.
37
 Between 1870 and 1932, a number of state courts 
and the majority of the federal courts recognized a defense to prosecution 
where government agents had instigated the crime, with various 
justifications.
38
 Previously, the government’s involvement in a crime was 
not viewed as affording a defense to an individual who was enticed into 
committing a crime, although it may have provided the basis for a 
prosecution of the government agent. 
The United States Supreme Court did not consider this emerging 
defense until 1932. However, four years earlier, in 1928, Justice Louis 
Brandeis laid the groundwork for the Court’s eventual recognition of the 
defense. In Casey v. United States,
39
 Justice Brandeis wrote a dissent from 
the Court’s decision upholding the conviction of a lawyer for violating the 
federal narcotics laws. Casey smuggled morphine into a county jail upon 
the request of a prisoner who was a government informant. Although the 
case was presented on a sufficiency of the evidence claim, Brandeis 
 
 
 37. See KENNETH M. MURCHISON, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW DOCTRINES: THE FORGOTTEN 
INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL PROHIBITION 41–46 (1994).  
 38. See id. at 23–31; O’Brien v. United States, 51 F.2d 674 (7th Cir. 1931) (reversing 
defendants’ conviction for conspiracy to violate the Prohibition laws, finding that civil law principles 
of estoppel applied to government’s conduct in criminal cases and that there was no evidence that 
defendants previously had any disposition to commit the offenses that were the object of the charged 
conspiracy); Capuano v. United States, 9 F.2d 41, 42 (1st Cir. 1925) (reversing bribery conviction of 
defendant who owned business making hair tonics and toilet preparations where jury was not 
adequately instructed on entrapment; facts suggested that federal Prohibition agents extorted defendant 
into paying bribes to keep his license. Court suggested that government would be “estopped” from 
prosecuting where defendant “never conceived any intention of committing these offenses or any 
similar offenses.”); Newman v. United States, 299 F. 128, 132 (4th Cir. 1924) (affirming narcotics 
conviction of a physician who provided morphine to undercover agent under Narcotics Act where jury 
was accurately instructed on entrapment as precluding conviction if defendant was not “willing” to 
violate the law prior to being asked to do so by the undercover agent and “would not otherwise have 
violated the law”); Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1921) (reversing defendant’s 
conviction for selling morphine to a friend where trial court failed to instruct jury on entrapment; facts 
suggested that agents, using defendant’s friend, had induced defendant to procure and sell morphine 
whereas he otherwise never would have conceived of committing such a crime. Court stated 
conviction under such circumstances would be “unconscionable, contrary to public policy, and to the 
established law of the land . . . .”); Peterson v. United States, 255 F. 433 (9th Cir. 1919) (reversing 
defendant’s conviction for selling liquor to soldiers where jury was not adequately instructed on 
defense of entrapment as centering on whether defendant was induced into selling the liquor by the 
officers); Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915) (reversing as against public policy 
conviction of defendants for conspiring to unlawfully transport Chinese persons into the United States 
where trial court refused to instruct jury on defense of entrapment; criminal design originated with 
officers rather than defendant). In general, the state courts were slower to recognize entrapment as a 
defense than were the federal courts of appeals. See MARCUS, supra note 11, § 1.03. 
 39. 276 U.S. 413 (1928). 
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argued that the Court should have thrown out the indictment in order to 
“preserve the purity of [the] courts.”40 He explained:  
The obstacle to the prosecution lies in the fact that the alleged crime 
was instigated by officers of the Government; that the act for which 
the Government seeks to punish the defendant is the fruit of their 
criminal conspiracy to induce its commission. The Government may 
set decoys to entrap criminals. But it may not provoke or create a 
crime and then punish the criminal, its creature.
41
 
Although the reported facts of the case do not suggest that Casey was 
offered any extraordinary inducement to smuggle in the morphine, Justice 
Brandeis evidently was convinced that Casey was an otherwise law-
abiding man who would not have been involved in the drug trade had the 
government never approached him. It was this evaluation of Casey’s 
character that led him to deem the government’s conduct “unjustifiable.”42  
B. Sorrells: The Supreme Court Recognizes the Defense 
Four years after Casey, a majority of the Court for the first time 
explicitly recognized a defense of entrapment, although not on the basis of 
the legal reasoning urged by Justice Brandeis. In Sorrells v. United 
States,
43
 the Court vacated the defendant’s conviction for violating the 
Prohibition Act because the trial court had refused to instruct the jury on 
the defense of entrapment. Sorrells was a World War I veteran whom a 
government prohibition agent persuaded to sell him liquor during a visit to 
the defendant’s home. The agent was posing as a tourist and (truthfully) 
told the defendant that they had served in the same Division in the 
military.
44
 The agent repeatedly stated that he wanted to bring a half-
gallon of liquor home with him when he left town. Initially, the defendant 
responded that he did not have any whiskey. However, after several 
additional requests–intermingled with a discussion about the war–the 
defendant left and returned with the requested half-gallon of liquor.
45
 
Although several government witnesses testified that Sorrells had “the 
general reputation of a rum runner,”46 the government offered no evidence 
 
 
 40. Id. at 425. 
 41. Id. at 423. 
 42. Id. 
 43. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).  
 44. Id. at 439. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 441. 
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that the defendant had ever previously possessed or sold liquor. To the 
contrary, witnesses for the defendant testified that he was of good 
character and had maintained steady employment.
47
 
Reviewing the evidence, the Court made clear that it found the agent’s 
methods unsavory—particularly his appeal to the defendant’s sympathy as 
a fellow veteran—calling these methods “a gross abuse of authority,” 
“deserv[ing] the severest condemnation.”48 But whether the Court’s 
disapproval of such methods “precludes prosecution or affords a ground of 
defense, and, if so, upon what theory,”49 was, for the majority of the Court, 
a difficult question. In a concurring opinion, Justice Roberts, joined by 
Justice Brandeis and Justice Stone, urged the Court to reverse for the 
reasons set forth in Justice Brandeis’s Casey dissent—on the grounds of 
“public policy,” to protect the “purity of [the Court’s] own temple” from 
“such prostitution of the criminal law.”50 But the majority was not 
persuaded that it had the authority to preclude a prosecution on that basis. 
“Where defendant has been duly indicted for an offense found to be within 
the statute, and the proper authorities seek to proceed with the prosecution, 
the court cannot refuse to try the case in the constitutional method because 
it desires to let the defendant go free.”51 Decisions of public policy in the 
nature of what conduct was deserving of punishment were entrusted to the 
Legislative Branch. The decision to grant clemency in the individual case 
was entrusted to the Executive Branch. Was it not usurping the authority 
of these other branches to bar prosecutions or grant immunity to a 
particular defendant because the Court disagreed with the police methods 
used?
52
 
The Court found a way out of this dilemma by resort to the judiciary’s 
authority to construe criminal statutes and the tradition of construing 
statutes so as to avoid “absurd consequences or flagrant injustice.”53 Chief 
 
 
 47. The Government’s brief in Sorrells included the following facts which were not included in 
the Supreme Court’s opinion: that a few weeks after this sale, the agent returned to Sorrells’ home 
with another agent, to whom Sorrells made a sale of whiskey; and that two weeks after that second 
sale, agents returned with a search warrant and found eleven, one-half gallon fruit jars full of whisky in 
a thicket about 100 yards below Sorrells’ house and a ten-gallon keg containing three to four gallons of 
wine in a field just above the house. Brief for the United States at 4–5, Sorrells v. United States, 287 
U.S. 435 (1932) (No. 177).  
 48. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 457 (Roberts, J., concurring). 
 51.  Id. at 450. 
 52. See Carlson, supra note 30, at 1026 (“At the time of the Sorrells case, the Court was 
preoccupied with a dispute over the Court’s power to control the general administration of criminal 
justices in the federal courts.”).  
 53.  Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 446. 
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Justice Hughes wrote that the very same reasons of public policy cited by 
Justice Roberts counseled in favor of holding that Sorrells was not guilty 
because his actions did not fall within the National Prohibition Act, 
properly construed. He wrote:  
If the requirements of the highest public policy in the maintenance 
of the integrity of administration would preclude the enforcement of 
the statute in such circumstances as are present here, the same 
considerations justify the conclusion that the case lies outside the 
purview of the Act and that its general words should not be 
construed to demand a proceeding at once inconsistent with that 
policy and abhorrent to the sense of justice.
54
  
Thus, according to the Court’s analysis, Congress could not have intended 
to criminalize conduct engaged in at the instigation of government agents, 
where the defendant “had no previous disposition to commit it.”55 
Although Justice Roberts called this interpretive device “strained and 
unwarranted,”56 it solved the majority’s problem of locating the authority 
for the recognition of the defense.  
As for the content of the standard for entrapment, the majority focused 
explicitly, as Justice Brandeis had implicitly in Casey, on the character of 
the defendant. The defense would only be available, according to Chief 
Justice Hughes’ opinion, if the defendant was an “otherwise innocent.”57 
That is, the Court did not divine in the Prohibition Act a congressional 
purpose to exclude certain investigative techniques per se, but rather their 
use to ensnare and prosecute the wrong people.
58
 The Court used the 
language about the “otherwise innocent” person several times, 
emphasizing that the difference between the appropriate use of “[a]rtifice 
and stratagem . . . to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises,” and 
entrapment was whether the criminal design originates with the target of 
the investigation or instead the officials of the government.
59
 The Court 
explained: 
The appropriate object of this permitted activity, frequently 
essential to the enforcement of the law, is to reveal the criminal 
design; to expose the illicit traffic, the prohibited publication, the 
 
 
 54. Id. at 448–49. 
 55. Id. at 441. 
 56.  Id at 456 (Roberts, J., concurring). 
 57. Id. at 451. 
 58. Id. at 448.  
 59. Id. at 441. 
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fraudulent use of the mails, the illegal conspiracy, or other offenses, 
and thus to disclose the would-be violators of the law. A different 
question is presented when the criminal design originates with the 
officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an 
innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and 
induce its commission in order that they may prosecute.
60
 
In these passages, the “predisposition” test that remains the central 
component of the federal entrapment defense to this day was born.
61
 Under 
this approach, the test of entrapment is not whether the conduct of the law 
enforcement officers is objectively reasonable. Rather, it is whether that 
conduct caused a non-predisposed person to commit the offense. For this 
reason, it is also called the “subjective” test, because it focuses on the 
defendant’s subjective state of mind or character.62 To succeed on an 
entrapment claim under this standard, the defendant must prevail on two 
elements: first, that the government induced him to commit the crime; and 
second, that he was not predisposed to do so.
63
  
Having spent most of its opinion establishing the legal authority for the 
entrapment defense and its content, the Sorrells Court devoted little 
attention to practical aspects of the defense’s administration. Thus, the 
Court did not discuss at all who would bear the burden of proving 
entrapment (or what that burden was). Nor did the Court analyze at length 
whether entrapment was a judge or jury question. But in reversing and 
remanding on account of the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on 
entrapment, the Court implicitly held that the defense was to be decided by 
the jury.
64
 This was consistent with the practice of most Courts of Appeals 
that had considered entrapment to that point,
65
 as well as the general 
practice of submitting affirmative defenses to the jury. It also made sense 
to submit the defense to the jury, given the Court’s finding that a lack of 
predisposition rendered the defendant not guilty of the offense defined by 
the statute. By contrast, Justice Roberts thought the decision should be 
 
 
 60. Id. at 441–42. 
 61. For an interesting account of the development of the subjective test, which suggests that the 
Court was influenced by positivist criminology, see T. Ward Frampton, Predisposition and Positivism: 
The Forgotten Foundations of the Entrapment Doctrine, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111 (2013). 
 62. See Roiphe, supra note 34, at 257–58; Paul Marcus, Presenting, Back from the [Almost] 
Dead, The Entrapment Defense, 47 FLA. L. REV. 205, 214–15 (1995); Ronald J. Allen et al., Clarifying 
Entrapment, 89 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 408–09 (1999); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL 
LAW 535–36 (5th ed. 2010). 
 63. See LAFAVE, supra note 62, at 535–36; MARCUS, supra note 11, § 2.02. 
 64. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452. 
 65. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
996 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:979 
 
 
 
 
entrusted to the court, unless the court was in doubt as to the historical 
facts, in which case it could seek a recommendation from the jury. But 
whatever the jury might report to the judge, according to Justice Roberts’ 
view, “the power and the duty to act [on a finding of entrapment] remain 
with the court and not with the jury,”66 since the duty to protect the 
“purity” of the court was the Court’s alone. 
The Sorrells majority did, however, address directly two other points 
touching on the administration of the entrapment defense, albeit briefly. 
The first was whether the defense would be available with respect to 
offenses other than those set forth in the Prohibition Act. On this point, the 
Court recognized that, given the stated rationale of its holding, the 
availability of entrapment in other contexts would have to be considered 
on a case-by-case basis in light of the particular statute at issue and 
implied Congressional intent.
67
 But, in dicta, the Court suggested that 
entrapment ought to be available as a defense to most statutes, except for 
“crimes so heinous or revolting that the applicable law would admit of no 
exceptions.”68 To date, no Court has held that entrapment is not available 
as an implied affirmative defense to a particular statute. 
The second administrative point that the Sorrells Court addressed 
squarely was the admissibility of evidence of the defendant’s character and 
prior criminal acts. On this issue, the majority spoke clearly, answering 
objections raised by Justice Roberts: such evidence was admissible and 
was not collateral. In the Court’s view, evidence on such matters was 
central to the question at the heart of the entrapment defense: “whether the 
defendant is a person otherwise innocent whom the Government is seeking 
to punish for an alleged offense which is the product of the creative 
activity of its own officials.”69 If the defendant was disadvantaged by 
introduction of evidence of his character and background, he could not 
complain, for he would have “brought it upon himself by reason of the 
nature of the defense.”70 Thus, when entrapment was asserted, evidence 
regarding the activities of the government’s agents and evidence bearing 
on the defendant’s predisposition was properly placed before the finder of 
fact. This aspect of the Sorrells ruling has had a profound effect on the 
 
 
 66. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457. 
 67. Id. at 450–51 (“The conclusion we have reached upon these grounds carries its own 
limitation. We are dealing with a statutory prohibition and we are simply concerned to ascertain 
whether in the light of a plain public policy and of the proper administration of justice, conduct 
induced as stated should be deemed to be within that prohibition.”). 
 68. Id. at 451. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 451–52. 
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administration of the entrapment defense, in effect forcing many 
defendants to choose between asserting the defense and availing 
themselves of the usual rules of evidence
71
 that would keep such character 
evidence from the jury when it decides whether the government had met 
its burden of proof as to the essential elements of the offense. 
C. Sherman: The Court Reaffirms Sorrells’ Doctrinal Framework 
The Supreme Court did not decide another entrapment case for twenty-
five years, until Sherman v. United States.
72
 Sherman was a recovering 
drug addict who was seeking medical treatment for his addiction when a 
government informant approached him.
73
 As the Court described the 
events that ensued, “[s]everal accidental meetings followed, either at the 
doctor’s office or at the pharmacy where both filled their prescriptions 
from the doctor.”74 The two men discussed their experiences trying to 
overcome their addiction.
75
 Eventually, the informant asked Sherman to 
help him obtain narcotics, claiming that he was not responding to 
treatment.
76
 After initially resisting the topic, Sherman relented, obtained 
narcotics, and shared them with the informant, who reimbursed Sherman 
for part of his expenses.
77
 As a consequence of these events, Sherman 
himself returned to the use of narcotics.
78
  
After several such transactions, the informant alerted federal agents 
with whom he was already working on other matters.
79
 The agents, in turn, 
orchestrated several additional transactions with Sherman. Sherman was 
charged with violating the federal narcotics laws. His case went to trial, at 
which the jury was charged on the defense of entrapment as framed by the 
majority opinion in Sorrells—i.e., “whether the informer had convinced an 
otherwise unwilling person to commit a criminal act or whether [Sherman] 
was already predisposed to commit the act.”80 On the question of 
 
 
 71. Federal Rules of Evidence 404(a) and (b) generally preclude the use of evidence of a 
defendant’s character or prior bad acts, respectively, to provide action in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence only took effect in 1975, they codified 
long-standing common law practice in this regard. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a), Advisory Comm. note; 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 186 (Kenneth S. Braun et al. eds., 6th ed. 2006). 
 72. 356 U.S. 369 (1958). 
 73. Id. at 371. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 373. 
 79. Id. at 371. 
 80. Id. at 371–72. 
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predisposition, the government argued that Sherman “evinced a ‘ready 
complaisance’ to accede to [the informant’s] request.”81 The jury also 
heard evidence that Sherman had two prior narcotics convictions, one for 
illegally selling narcotics some nine years prior to the events in question, 
and one for illegally possessing narcotics some five years beforehand.
82
 
The jury rejected the entrapment defense and convicted Sherman. 
The Court set aside the conviction and held that Sherman had been 
entrapped as a matter of law. Chief Justice Earl Warren, who had joined 
the Court in 1953, wrote the relatively brief opinion for the Court, holding 
that the intervening twenty-five years since Sorrells had not in any way 
“detracted from the principles underlying that decision.”83 Although law 
enforcement may and frequently must use “stealth and strategy” to prevent 
crime and apprehend criminals, “[a] different question is presented when 
the criminal design originates with the officials of the Government, and 
they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit 
the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may 
prosecute.”84 In that case, Chief Justice Warren wrote, “stealth and 
strategy become as objectionable police methods as the coerced confession 
and the unlawful search.”85 This latter statement suggested that the Court 
might hold that entrapment implicated the Constitution. But, in the very 
next sentence, the Court made clear that it would reaffirm Sorrells’ 
dubious legislative intent rationale: “Congress could not have intended 
that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into 
violations.”86 Reviewing the evidence in total, the Court found that 
Sherman was clearly induced into obtaining the narcotics by the 
informants’ repeated requested and “resort to sympathy,”87 and that he was 
not predisposed. Specifically, the Court noted that, although Sherman had 
two prior narcotics convictions, the last one was five years before the 
conduct in question and there was no evidence that Sherman was actively 
involved in the trade of narcotics at the time that the informant approached 
him.
88
 For example, when the police searched Sherman’s apartment 
following his arrest, they did not find any narcotics.
89
 Nor did Sherman 
 
 
 81. Id. at 375. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. at 372. 
 84. Id. (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932)). 
 85. Id. at 372. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 373. 
 88. Id. at 375. 
 89. Id. 
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make any profit from the transactions with the informant.
90
 Absent such 
additional evidence, the Court did not find Sherman’s alleged “ready 
complaisance” to accede to the informant’s request sufficient to prove 
predisposition.
91
 The Court concluded:  
The case at bar illustrates an evil which the defense of entrapment is 
designed to overcome. The government informer entices someone 
attempting to avoid narcotics not only into carrying out an illegal 
sale but also into returning to the habit of use. Selecting the proper 
time, the informer then tells the government agent. The set-up is 
accepted by the agent without even a question as to the manner in 
which the informer encountered the seller. Thus the Government 
plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party and beguiles him into 
committing crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted. 
Law enforcement does not require methods such as this.
92
 
Notwithstanding the majority’s resounding rejection of the police methods 
used against Sherman, and its reversal of his conviction in spite of the 
jury’s verdict, four Justices did not join Chief Justice Warren’s opinion. 
Rather, they filed a concurring opinion, this time authored by Justice 
Frankfurter, reiterating many of the arguments made by Justice Roberts in 
Sorrells. The concurring justices in Sherman—consisting of Justices 
Frankfurter, Douglas, Harlan and Brennan—urged the Court to jettison the 
Sorrells legislative intent rationale, which they compellingly called a 
“sheer fiction.”93 Instead, they argued that the Court should ground the bar 
to conviction in the courts’ “supervisory jurisdiction over the 
administration of criminal justice”94—a source of authority that the Court 
had recognized in the intervening years since Sorrells, but which was for 
all practical purposes the same authority to which Justice Roberts appealed 
in his Sorrells concurrence. On this view, courts, not juries, should make 
the decision about entrapment because the responsibility to protect its 
functions and “the purity of its own temple belongs only to the court.”95 In 
addition, only the courts “through the gradual evolution of explicit 
standards in accumulated precedents” can give specific guidance for 
official conduct in the future, which “the wise administration of criminal 
 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 376 (footnote omitted). 
 93. Id. at 379 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 94. Id. at 381 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 95. Id. at 385 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 
(Roberts, J., concurring)). 
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justice demands.”96 The concurring justices also worried, as had Justice 
Roberts in his Sorrells concurrence, about submitting the entrapment 
defense to the jury rather than the court given the evidentiary 
consequences. Under the Sorrells framework, they argued, a defendant 
faced the choice of either foregoing an entrapment defense or “run[ning] 
the substantial risk that, in spite of instructions, the jury will allow a 
criminal record or bad reputation to weigh in its determination of guilt of 
the specific offense of which he stands charged.”97  
As for the substance of the entrapment standard, the concurring justices 
in Sherman set forth a much more coherent statement of an alternative to 
the Sorrells predisposition test than had Justice Roberts in his Sorrells 
concurrence. They argued that entrapment should focus on the conduct of 
the law enforcement officers rather than the predisposition of the 
defendant, because the latter standard “loses sight of the underlying reason 
for the defense of entrapment”—i.e., that no matter what crimes a person 
may have committed in the past, “certain police conduct to ensnare him 
into further crime is not to be tolerated by an advanced society.”98 In the 
following paragraph, Justice Frankfurter crystallized what has become 
known as the “objective” test for entrapment and its rationale: 
[T]he police may . . . act so as to detect those engaged in criminal 
conduct and ready and willing to commit further crimes should the 
occasion arise. Such indeed is their obligation. . . . [But] in holding 
out inducements they should act in such a manner as is likely to 
induce to the commission of crime only these persons and not others 
who would normally avoid crime and through self-struggle resist 
ordinary temptations. This test shifts attention from the record and 
predisposition of the particular defendant to the conduct of the 
police and the likelihood, objectively considered, that it would 
entrap only those ready and willing to commit crime.
99
 
Scholars generally have favored Justice Frankfurter’s “objective test” for 
entrapment.
100
 It was adopted, with some modification, in the Model Penal 
 
 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. at 382. 
 98. Id. at 382–83. 
 99. Id. at 383–84. 
 100. See Seidman, supra note 26, at 115 n.13 (stating “[t]he commentators have overwhelmingly 
favored an objective approach focusing on the propriety of the government’s conduct” and collecting 
representative commentary); Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 167 
n.13 (1975–76) (same); LAFAVE, supra note 62, at 538 (“The objective approach is favored by a 
majority of the commentators . . . .”). While the two tests are animated by different concerns, they do 
not necessarily lead to different outcomes in any particular case. See Seidman, supra note 26, at 120 
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Code promulgated by the American Law Institute in 1962.
101
 A number of 
states have adopted the objective test, either by statute or through their 
courts’ common lawmaking.102 The objective test was incorporated into 
the proposed revised federal criminal code that Congress considered in the 
1980s.
103
 However, the objective test has never become federal law. More 
than eighty years since the Court decided Sorrells, notwithstanding 
sustained criticism from the academy
104
 and by some jurists, Sorrells’ 
framework still controls in federal court and in the majority of states that 
modeled their entrapment defense on the federal standard.
105
  
D. Why Didn’t the Court Treat Entrapment as a Procedural and Evidence 
Law Question? 
For a lawyer trained in the post-Warren Court era, it is difficult to hear 
the concerns about police methods that were raised repeatedly in the 
opinions in Sorrells and Sherman and not immediately start thinking about 
the exclusionary rule. Sorrells may have cast entrapment as an affirmative 
defense, and thus a matter of substantive criminal law, but surely it is not 
solely a matter of substantive criminal law in the sense of measuring 
individual criminal culpability. After all, government inducement is a 
necessary precondition to assertion of the entrapment defense; the defense 
is simply unavailable to one who was induced to commit a crime by a 
private agent.
106
 Although the predisposition of the defendant is the usual 
 
 
(“In virtually every case . . . the objective and subjective tests produce the same results . . . .”); Ronald 
J. Allen et al., Clarifying Entrapment, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407, 409 (1999) (“The 
controversy over the two versions of the test—the subjective and objective—is quite beside the point, 
because the two tests will virtually never lead to different results . . . .”); Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, 
Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies By the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 779–80 n.19 (1997) (“in 
practice these tests are almost indistinguishable”). 
 101. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Official Draft 1962). 
 102. See MARCUS, supra note 11, § 1.05; LAFAVE, supra note 62, at 539 (noting that the objective 
approach was adopted by judicial decision in Alaska in 1969 and several other states have now 
adopted it by statute or judicial decision). 
 103. See NAT’L COMM’N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL CODE § 702(2) (1971). 
 104. The literature criticizing the Court’s entrapment doctrine as lacking a coherent theoretical 
foundation is voluminous. See, e.g., Frampton, supra note 61, at 115 (reviewing the literature); 
Roiphe, supra note 34, at 293–98 (same); Carlson, supra note 28, at 1018-19; Seidman, supra note 26, 
at 115 nn.12–13, 128; Park, supra note 100, at 167 (1976); Notes & Comments, The Serpent Beguiled 
Me and I Did Eat, The Constitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YALE L.J. 942 (1965). 
 105. See MARCUS, supra note 11, § 1.05; LAFAVE, supra note 62, at 535 n.47 (noting that the 
subjective test is adhered to by the federal courts and the majority of state courts); Eda Katherine 
Tinto, Undercover Policing, Overstated Culpability, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1410 (2013) (same).  
 106. See Richard H. McAdams, Reforming Entrapment Doctrine in United States v. 
Hollingsworth, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1795, 1796–97 n.10 (2007) (“There is no entrapment defense unless 
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focus of entrapment litigation, that fact should not obscure the important 
sense in which the defense is also animated by concerns about perceived 
misconduct by law enforcement actors. The “evil which the defense of 
entrapment is designed to overcome”107 is the persuasion of an otherwise 
innocent person to commit a crime by government agents. Entrapment thus 
presents the same kinds of concerns that we have grown accustomed to 
having courts, not juries, weigh in a pretrial setting when they must decide 
whether to admit evidence allegedly obtained in contravention of a 
defendant’s constitutional or statutory rights.108 Indeed, juries routinely are 
instructed that the means by which evidence was obtained are not properly 
the subject of their review.
109
 The predisposition question also requires the 
same kind of counterfactual analysis in which courts often engage in the 
context of pretrial evidentiary hearings, namely evaluating the effect of 
police action on a particular individual’s behavior or on a course of events. 
For example, courts frequently must decide whether the police action in a 
particular instance caused a defendant to confess or consent to a search 
voluntarily,
110
 whether police would have inevitably discovered evidence 
through untainted means, and whether an eyewitness had a sufficient basis 
to make a reliable identification notwithstanding having been exposed to 
suggestive police identification procedures.
111
 These are not the kinds of 
question we typically submit to juries in criminal trials, although they are 
now routine for federal judges. 
So why is it that the Sorrells Court treated entrapment as an affirmative 
defense to be submitted to the jury, rather than a procedural and evidence 
law question for the judge, when the latter characterization seems at least 
equally, if not more, compelling? The short answer is that entrapment may 
sound like a procedural and evidence law question from our vantage point 
today, but it did not appear that way to the Court in 1932. The struggle that 
the Sorrells Court engaged over the source of its authority even to 
recognize entrapment at all—in any form—was real. As set forth below, 
 
 
government agents induced the crime. No matter how unwilling or reluctant a defendant is, no matter 
what pressure is brought to bear short of duress, if those who tempt him are purely nongovernmental 
actors, there is no defense.”). See also Seidman, supra note 26 at 128; United States v. Squillacote, 221 
F.3d 542, 573 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1203 (7th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 962–63 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Emmert, 9 F.3d 699, 
703 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Maddox, 492 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 107. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958). 
 108. See infra Part II. 
 109. See, e.g., United States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 206 (2d Cir. 2006) (approving use of such a 
charge even in combination with an entrapment charge). 
 110. See infra Parts II.A–B. 
 111. Id. 
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there was no precedent at that time for the Court to halt a prosecution 
based on unsavory police methods or to exclude evidence that satisfied 
generally applicable rules of evidence, unless it was obtained in violation 
of an express constitutional right. And entrapment did not violate any 
express constitutional right.  
Moreover, the principle that otherwise admissible evidence could be 
excluded from a criminal trial because it was obtained in violation of an 
express constitutional provision was still of relatively recent vintage and 
was narrowly applied. The common law rule, infamously repeated in 
Olmstead v. United States
112
 in 1928, had long been that the “admissibility 
of evidence is not affected by the illegality of the means by which it was 
obtained.”113 The one well-established exception to this rule was for 
involuntary confessions induced by federal agents, which since the end of 
the nineteenth century, the Court had found to be inadmissible in federal 
court pursuant to the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against compelled self-
incrimination.
114
 Thus, to ask why the Sorrells Court did not treat 
entrapment as a procedural and evidence law question is to misunderstand 
the historical context in which the issue first arose. 
1. The Exclusionary Rule Prior to 1932 
The first Supreme Court case arguably expanding the exclusionary rule 
for evidence beyond involuntary confessions was Boyd v. United States,
115
 
decided in 1886. Boyd, however, was an unusual case.
116
 It was a 
forfeiture proceeding arising out of a failure to pay customs duties on 
imported goods. In the course of the proceeding, the government obtained 
an order compelling Boyd and his fellow owners to produce the invoices 
for the goods; the Government then introduced the invoices as evidence in 
the forfeiture proceeding. The Supreme Court held that this entire 
procedure violated the owners’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights to be 
 
 
 112. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).  
 113. Id. at 467. 
 114. In Bram v. United States, drawing upon both English and American cases, the Court held that 
the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination applied to out-of-court confessions, 
such that a confession would not be admissible unless it was “free and voluntary—that is, not 
produced by inducements engendering either hope or fear.” Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 557–
58 (1897). The Court “adhered to this reasoning” thereafter. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 462 
(1966). See, e.g., Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1924) (“[A] confession 
obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever may have been the character of the compulsion, 
and whether the compulsion was applied in a judicial proceeding or otherwise.”). 
 115. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 116. For a discussion of Boyd’s unusual posture, see William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of 
Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 422–24 (1995).  
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free from unreasonable searches and seizures and from providing 
testimony (in the form of the invoices) against themselves.
117
 For many 
years, it was the combined nature of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
violation present in Boyd that was thought to justify its holding.
118
 Thus, 
Boyd was not immediately viewed as creating a new exclusionary rule of 
evidence in criminal cases. Indeed, in 1904, the Supreme Court held in 
Adams v. New York
119
 that the admission of evidence seized pursuant to a 
warrantless search raised no constitutional problem, distinguishing Boyd 
on the grounds that Boyd concerned the compulsory production of 
evidence.
120
  
It was not until Weeks v. United States
121
 that the Court held that 
evidence should have been excluded principally because the evidence was 
obtained in violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. And 
yet, although Weeks has long been widely cited as “fashioning a novel 
exclusionary rule for federal criminal trials,”122 Weeks actually resolved a 
property law question: the authority of the government to hold onto a 
person’s property obtained during an unlawful search for subsequent use 
as evidence at a trial.
123
 Weeks was accused of running an unlawful lottery 
scheme through the mails.
124
 At his trial, the government introduced items, 
including lottery tickets, seized during a warrantless search of his home.
125
 
Repeatedly prior to and during his criminal trial, Weeks unsuccessfully 
petitioned for the return of his property. The Supreme Court held that this 
was error; the government’s desire to use the property as evidence did not 
supersede Weeks’ right to have the property returned to him.126 
Notwithstanding this property law cast, Weeks ultimately did lead to the 
more generally applicable exclusionary rule that is more familiar to us.
127
 
In a series of cases decided between 1920 and 1925, the Court firmly 
established that any evidence seized during an unlawful search of a 
 
 
 117. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 638. 
 118. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661–66 (1961) (Black, J., concurring); see also Potter 
Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development, and Future of the 
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1983).  
 119. 192 U.S. 585 (1904). 
 120.  Id. at 596–97. 
 121. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).  
 122. Sina Kian, The Path of the Constitution: The Original System of Remedies, How it Changed, 
and How the Court Responded, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 132, 170 (2012).  
 123. Id. at 172. 
 124. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 386. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 393.  
 127. In Wolf v. Colorado, the Supreme Court described Weeks as having announced the 
exclusionary rule for the first time. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28–29 (1949). 
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defendant’s home or place of business must be excluded from his or her 
criminal trial, as well as any evidence derived therefrom (including copies 
made of the evidence), even if the defendant did not petition for its return 
beforehand.
128
  
The foregoing chronology demonstrates that, in 1932, when the Court 
decided Sorrells, the exclusionary rule in federal court for violations of the 
Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures 
in federal criminal trials was still relatively new. There was no precedent 
for excluding evidence that was not obtained in violation of an express 
constitutional right, and limited authority for exclusion even where an 
express provision was violated (i.e. thus far, the exclusionary rule had only 
been applied for violations of the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures). If any part of the Constitution were implicated by 
what the police had done in Sorrells, it could only be the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, with its promise of fundamental fairness 
in the relationship between the individual and the government.
129
 But the 
Court did not see entrapment as raising an issue under the Due Process 
Clause—understandably, given that there was no precedent to view it as 
such—nor had the Court extended the exclusionary rule to violations of 
the Due Process Clause. Given this historical context, it is understandable 
that the Sorrells Court did not view entrapment as raising a question about 
the admissibility of evidence. The only options before the Court, if it were 
to provide relief to the defendant, were the legislative intent rationale 
adopted by the Sorrells majority, or the “public policy” rationale adopted 
by the minority. Yet, neither of the parties in Sorrells provided the Court 
with any authority for the proposition that the courts could bar the 
Executive branch from using the courts to enforce the criminal laws based 
on public policy. The majority’s approach may have seemed logically 
strained, but the minority’s approach apparently struck most of the justices 
as lawless.   
 
 
 128. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Gouled v. United States, 
255 U.S. 298 (1921); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925). 
 129. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 (1977) (citing the standard of “fairness as 
required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 
227, 235–36 (1940) (“[I]n view of its historical setting and the wrongs which called it into being, the 
due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment—just as that in the Fifth—has led few to doubt 
that it was intended to guarantee procedural standards adequate and appropriate, then and thereafter, to 
protect, at all times, people charged with or suspected of crime by those holding positions of power 
and authority.”) (footnote omitted). 
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2. The Exclusionary Rule from 1932 to 1958 (Sorrells to Sherman) 
Between the Court’s decision in Sorrells and the next time the Court 
considered entrapment, in Sherman (1958), there was considerable change 
in the Court-made exclusionary rules of evidence. First, the Court started 
to apply the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions pursuant to the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Second, the Court 
articulated a doctrine of its own “supervisory power” from which the 
Court divined the authority to exclude evidence obtained in violation of a 
defendant’s statutory, rather than constitutional, rights. But, for the reasons 
set forth below, neither development was sufficient to cause the Court to 
reframe entrapment when it had the opportunity to do so. 
The Court’s extension of the exclusionary rule to state criminal 
prosecutions pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
started, as the exclusionary rule first did, with coerced confessions. In 
Brown v. Mississippi,
130
 the Court held that a state capital murder 
conviction based upon a confession that clearly was the result of torture 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
131
 The 
Court reaffirmed this principle in Chambers v. Florida,
132
 another capital 
case, where the evidence of physical abuse was less clear, though not the 
extent of the psychological coercion.
133
 In both instances, the Court 
grounded its decision in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because the Court had not yet incorporated the Fifth 
Amendment’s self-incrimination clause to the states.134 Thus, the standard 
that the Court applied in determining whether a constitutional violation 
had occurred in Brown and Chambers was the fundamental fairness 
substantive due process test, which asked whether the official conduct 
“‘offends some principles of justice so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”135 The Court 
 
 
 130. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
 131. Id. at 287. The defendants in Brown had been brutally whipped and beaten until they 
confessed. Id. at 281. 
 132. 309 U.S. 227 (1940). 
 133. Id. at 239–41. The defendants in Chambers were interrogated over the course of five days 
until they finally confessed. During that time, they were not allowed to speak with counsel, and were 
frequently surrounded by angry members of the community. Id.  
 134. In the 1960s, the Court incorporated “almost all of the criminal procedure guarantees found 
in the Bill of Rights.” Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The 
Supreme Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 304 (2001). See also 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 1 CRIM. PROC. § 2.4 (3d ed. 2011). In Malloy v. Hogan, the Court formally 
incorporated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 135. Brown, 297 U.S. at 285 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). See also 
Chambers, 309 U.S. at 238 (“This requirement—of conforming to fundamental standards of procedure 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss4/4
  
 
 
 
 
2014] THE ANOMALY OF ENTRAPMENT 1007 
  
 
 
 
had no difficulty determining that the right against compelled self-
incrimination was so fundamental. 
In the context of confessions coerced by state actors, this Due Process 
standard merged relatively soon with the Fifth Amendment voluntariness 
standard.
136
 But in other contexts, the Court was slower to find that rights 
made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment were 
essentially equivalent to those guaranteed by the Bill of Rights against the 
federal government.
137
 It also was slower to impose the exclusionary rule 
on the states for violations of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Thus, for example, in Wolf v. Colorado
138
 the Supreme Court 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause protected 
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by state actors, much 
like the Fourth Amendment protected individuals from similar action by 
federal officials, finding that this right was “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty.”139 Yet in the very same opinion, the Court declined to 
require that state courts exclude evidence obtained in violation of this Due 
Process right. Rather, implicitly finding the exclusionary rule was not 
constitutionally mandated, the Court left the appropriate remedy to the 
states.
140
 It was not until Mapp v. Ohio
141
 that the Supreme Court 
overruled this portion of Wolf and held that the Due Process Clause also 
 
 
in criminal trials—was made operative against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). In the pre-
incorporation decades, the Court did not settle on any one single description of the Due Process 
fundamental fairness test, but offered a number of different descriptions of what kinds of state action 
would fail it. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 134; see also Israel, supra, note 134, at 351–53. 
 136. “The marked shift to the federal standard in state cases began with Lisenba v. California 
. . . .” Malloy, 378 U.S. at 7 (referencing Lisbena v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 239 (1941)). See also id. 
at 6–7 (noting that the distinction between the Brown Due Process test and the Fifth Amendment 
standard “was soon abandoned, and today the admissibility of a confession in a state prosecution is 
tested by the same standard applied in federal prosecutions”). 
 137. See, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause provided state criminal defendant with right to counsel in some circumstances, but not 
to the same extent as the right afforded by Sixth Amendment), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335 (1963). See generally McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3032 (2010) (“[E]ven 
when a right set out in the Bill of Rights was held to fall within the conception of due process, the 
protection or remedies afforded against state infringement sometimes differed from the protection or 
remedies provided against abridgement by the Federal Government.”); Jerold H. Israel, Selective 
Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 281 (1982) (“In applying the fundamental fairness doctrine 
from the early 1930s through the early 1960’s, the Court . . . viewed due process as encompassing 
many of the same basic principles as the Bill of Rights guarantees, but generally assumed that due 
process limits on state action derived from these principles were narrower than the limits imposed on 
the federal government by the Bill of Rights.”).  
 138. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
 139. Id. at 27–28 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
 140. Id. at 28. 
 141. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1008 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:979 
 
 
 
 
required the exclusion at criminal proceedings of evidence obtained in 
violation of this right.
142
    
The period between Sorrells and Sherman also saw the Court exclude 
evidence obtained in violation of federal statutes. In Nardone v. United 
States,
143
 the Court held that evidence obtained in violation of the Federal 
Communications Act, pursuant to an unlawful wiretap, was 
inadmissible.
144
 And in McNabb v. United States,
145
 the Court excluded a 
confession obtained by federal agents who failed to comply with federal 
statutes requiring that an arrested individual promptly be presented before 
a neutral magistrate.
146
 In McNabb, the Court articulated a theory of its 
authority for excluding such evidence, which it dubbed the Court’s 
inherent “supervisory authority.”147 The Court viewed this authority as the 
power to formulate rules of evidence and procedure for federal criminal 
trials not “derived solely from the Constitution” nor “limited to the strict 
canons of evidentiary relevance.”148  
Although these statements by Justice Frankfurter (who would go on to 
write the concurring opinion in Sherman) sound like a sweeping assertion 
of authority, in the context of the McNabb case, the Court’s invocation of 
the supervisory authority was actually rather modest. It was tethered to 
particular federal statutes requiring a prompt presentment that were silent 
as to what consequence, if any, followed if their terms were violated. 
Citing the legislative policy reflected in these statutes to protect against the 
abuses associated with the “third degree”149—and also the particularly 
egregious facts of the case
150—the Court reversed the convictions to 
remedy the unlawful introduction of the confessions.
151
 But signaling 
perhaps that the Court’s agenda was indeed to expand its authority to 
 
 
 142. See id. at 656 (describing the exclusionary rule as “constitutionally necessary”); see also 
Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution As a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 
1561 (1972) (“By requiring [in Mapp] that the rule of exclusion be followed in state criminal cases, the 
Court was necessarily making a judgment that the rule was constitutionally based.”).  
 143. 302 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 144. Id. at 384–85. 
 145. 318 U.S. 332 (1943). 
 146. Id. at 342. This requirement is now codified in FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). 
 147. Id. at 341. 
 148. Id. See generally Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 324, 328–32 (2006) (reviewing history of Supreme Court’s exercise of its supervisory 
power, beginning with McNabb); Beale, supra note 36, at 1435–55 (same). 
 149. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 344. 
 150. The three McNabb defendants were convicted of the murder of a federal agent, largely on the 
basis of their post-arrest statements made during lengthy periods of interrogation, without access to 
friends or counsel. See id. at 338. 
 151. Id. at 347. 
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exclude evidence beyond constitutional violations, the Court made clear 
that it was not reversing because the confessions were involuntary under 
the Fifth Amendment standard.
152
 The Court did not reach that issue. 
Rather, the basis for the Court’s decision was the violation of the federal 
statutes.
153
 The Court offered a fig-leaf, however, to those who might read 
its opinion as purporting to directly regulate the practices of federal law 
enforcement agents: the opinion stated that the Court’s only concern with 
such practices arose at the point when the “courts themselves become 
instruments of law enforcement.”154 Justice Frankfurter wrote, “a 
conviction resting on evidence secured through such a flagrant disregard 
of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to 
stand without making the courts themselves accomplices in willful 
disobedience of law.”155  
McNabb thus reads like a vindication of Justice Roberts’ view in 
Sorrells (and Justice Brandeis’ view in Casey)156 that the courts have the 
authority to protect the purity of their own functions from becoming 
tainted by improper conduct committed by officers of the Executive 
Branch. Indeed, had the Court revisited entrapment immediately following 
McNabb, there is a chance that the Roberts/Brandeis/Frankfurter view 
might have garnered more support. But the McNabb aura, if there was one, 
did not last long. Many lower courts, and Congress, greeted McNabb with 
hostility.
157
 The Court’s narrow holding regarding the requirements of the 
federal statutes requiring prompt presentment was challenged repeatedly in 
a number of cases between 1943 and 1958, and Congressional opponents 
of McNabb made a serious, although ultimately unsuccessful, effort to 
overrule it by legislation in 1958.
158
 Although the Court invoked the 
 
 
 152. Id. at 340. 
 153. Id. at 345. 
 154. Id. at 347. 
 155. Id. at 345.  
 156. See supra text accompanying notes 39–40. 
 157. See James E. Hogan & Joseph M. Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale, and 
Rescue, 47 GEO. L.J. 1, 5 (1958). 
 158. Id. at 34–39, 42–46. There were several versions of the legislation to overrule McNabb, some 
focusing on the content of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) and others on the rule of exclusion 
announced in McNabb. See id. at 35. The legislation that passed the House of Representatives would 
have done away with McNabb’s rule of exclusion. The proponents of that legislation backed away 
from the proposal, however, after amendments in the Senate undermined it significantly. McNabb was 
later superseded by Miranda v. Arizona, in which the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination required police to advise those in custody of their constitutional 
rights before commencing interrogation, and that any statements obtained in the absence of such 
warnings would be inadmissible. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In 1968, Congress 
passed legislation to overrule both McNabb and Miranda. See Beale, supra note 36, at 1454. The 
Supreme Court ultimately held this measure unconstitutional. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 
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supervisory authority articulated by Justice Frankfurter’s opinion to 
announce various procedural rules for the federal courts in the years 
following McNabb,
159
 it did not invoke its supervisory authority to expand 
the exclusionary rule further until Elkins v. United States,
160
 decided two 
years after Sherman.
161
  
During this same period (the post-Sorrels, pre-Sherman era) the Court 
also decided Rochin v. California.
162
 Like Brown, Chambers, Wolf, and 
McNabb, Rochin reflected the Court’s increasing concern with overly 
aggressive police practices. In Rochin, police officers broke into a man’s 
home, tried to force out of his mouth several morphine capsules that he 
had swallowed, and ultimately took him to a hospital where a doctor 
pumped his stomach.
163
 As a consequence, the police obtained the 
capsules, which were introduced into evidence at Rochin’s trial. Justice 
Frankfurter wrote the opinion for the Court holding that Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the exclusion of this 
evidence.
164
 In the Court’s view, this conduct “shock[ed] the 
conscience”165 and “‘offend[ed] those cannons of decency and fairness 
which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even 
toward those charged with the most heinous offenses.’”166 The methods 
used by the officers were “too close to the rack and the screw to permit of 
constitutional differentiation.”167 
Two decades later, the Court would cite Rochin to suggest that the Due 
Process Clause provided an independent limit on undercover 
governmental action, on top of the entrapment defense, such that a 
conviction could not stand if the conduct of government officials was so 
outrageous as to “shock the conscience,” even if the defendant were 
 
 
428, 437–38 (2000) (holding that Miranda was a constitutional decision and therefore could not be 
overridden by Congress).  
 159. See Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (invoking supervisory powers to hold that 
district courts could not dismiss wage earners from juries solely on that basis); Jencks v. United States, 
353 U.S. 657 (1957) (holding that defense in federal criminal prosecution was entitled to obtain for 
impeachment purposes statement made by witnesses to government agents). 
 160. 364 U.S. 206 (1960). 
 161. In Elkins, the Court abrogated the so-called “silver platter doctrine.” Id. at 208. Further, the 
Court held that evidence obtained by state actors in circumstances that would violate the Fourth 
Amendment if engaged in by federal agents was inadmissible in federal court—a holding that was 
rendered moot the next year by Mapp. Id. at 223–24. 
 162. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
 163. Id. at 166. 
 164. Id. at 174. 
 165. Id. at 172. 
 166. Id. at 169 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416–17 (1945)). 
 167. Id. at 172. 
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predisposed.
168
 As set forth below, the existence of this Due Process limit 
remains a matter of dispute—a dispute that largely has been papered over 
by the fact that (with one exception) courts have never found that it was 
breached.
169
 Today, defendants asserting entrapment frequently also assert 
(unsuccessfully) a government misconduct Due Process claim. And yet 
neither party in Sherman even cited Rochin in its brief—a testament to the 
fact that, by the time Sherman was before the Court, Rochin was not 
understood as a major expansion of Due Process protection but instead as 
an instance of case-specific error correction driven by its rather unique and 
brutal facts.
170
  
In sum, although there were significant developments in the Supreme 
Court’s application of the exclusionary rule for violations of defendant’s 
constitutional and statutory rights between 1932 (Sorrells) and 1958 
(Sherman), those developments were not sufficient to cause a majority of 
the Court to view entrapment doctrine through that lens—or even to cause 
the parties in Sherman to ask the Court to reassess the principles 
articulated in Sorrells. In 1958, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment was not understood as an independent source of authority to 
exclude evidence that resulted from police action unless those actions met 
the high “shock the conscience” standard or violated some other specific 
constitutional guarantee. The Court had shown a willingness to exclude 
evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s statutory rights, and had 
articulated a theory of a supervisory authority in McNabb and its progeny 
that might allow courts to shut their doors to cases and evidence in an even 
broader range of circumstances. But the Court had not yet applied the 
entrapment doctrine to exclude a case or evidence without a basis for 
doing so in an express provision of law. It is thus not surprising that a 
majority of the Court—even in an opinion authored by Chief Justice 
Warren, who had joined the Court in 1953 but by 1958 had not yet 
 
 
 168. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973); see also Part II.B.2, infra. 
 169. See infra text accompanying notes 262–63. 
 170. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1954) (refusing to extend Rochin to hold that the 
use of evidence obtained through the warrantless installation of eavesdropping equipment in a 
defendant’s home was violative of Due Process and distinguishing Rochin on the grounds that it 
“presented an element totally lacking here—coercion . . . applied by a physical assault upon [the 
defendant’s] person”) (citation omitted); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957) (refusing to 
extend Rochin to hold that the use of evidence derived from by taking a defendant’s blood while he 
was unconscious was violative of Due Process, and distinguishing Rochin on the grounds that the 
officer’s conduct overall in Rochin was “brutal” and “offensive,” whereas “there is nothing ‘brutal’ or 
‘offensive’ in the taking of a sample of blood when done, as in this case, under the protective eye of a 
physician”).  
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assumed the activist role for which he would later become known
171—saw 
no reason, strategically or doctrinally, to revisit the basic premises of 
Sorrells when it had the opportunity to do so. The agents in Sherman had 
violated no constitutional or statutory right belonging to Sherman. The 
entire Court agreed that Sherman’s conviction must be reversed. Thus, in 
Justice Warren’s view, revisiting Sorrells’ doctrinal framework, as the 
minority of Justices urged, especially without the benefit of briefing, 
would “entail both overruling a leading decision of this Court and 
brushing aside the possibility that we would be creating more problems 
than we would supposedly be solving.”172 
II. ENTRAPMENT AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN THE 1960S, 1970S, 
AND 1980S  
A. The 1960s: The Missing Decade for Entrapment; The Decade of the 
Exclusionary Rule 
The Court did not issue a major entrapment decision again until 
1973.
173
 The 1960s were, however, the decade of incorporation and of 
expansion of the exclusionary rule. As noted above, in Elkins v. United 
States, citing its supervisory authority, the Court abrogated the “silver 
platter doctrine” and held that evidence obtained by state actors in 
circumstances that would violate the Fourth Amendment if engaged in by 
federal agents was inadmissible in federal court.
174
 Then, in Mapp v. Ohio, 
the Court abrogated Wolf to hold that the exclusionary rule did apply to 
evidence seized by state agents in violation of a defendant’s Fourth 
 
 
 171. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—A 
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 127 (1983) (noting that in his first few years on the Court, Warren exhibited 
authoritarian tendencies and a reluctance to vote against a majority of the Court); Yale Kamisar, The 
Warren Court and Criminal Justice, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 116 (Bernard 
Schwartz ed., 1996) (“[W]hen we speak of the ‘Warren Court,’ we mean the Warren Court that lasted 
from 1962 (when Arthur Goldberg replaced Felix Frankfurter) to 1969 (when Earl Warren retired).”). 
 172. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 377–78 (1958). 
 173. In Lopez v. United States, the Supreme Court briefly considered a claim of entrapment but 
held that there was no evidence that the government induced the commission of the offense. See Lopez 
v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). It therefore did not reach the predisposition inquiry. Similarly, 
in Osborn v. United States, the Court succinctly rejected a claim that the defendant had been entrapped 
as a matter of law. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1967), The Court found that the 
evidence at most showed that the government informant had provided the defendant with the 
“opportunity or facilities” to commit the offense, “a far cry from entrapment.” Id. at 331–32.  
 174. 364 U.S. 206, 208 (1960).  
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Amendment rights in state court prosecutions (thus rendering Elkins 
moot).
175
 As the Court stated in Mapp,  
[t]o hold otherwise is to grant the right [to be free from 
unreasonable searches] but in reality to withhold its privilege and 
enjoyment. . . . [T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter—
to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only 
effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard 
it.’176  
In Gideon v. Wainright,
177
 the Court incorporated the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in all criminal prosecutions. In Malloy v. 
Hogan,
178
 the Court incorporated the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. And in Miranda v. Arizona
179
 and Massiah v. United 
States,
180
 the Court applied the exclusionary rule to hold inadmissible 
statements taken in violation of these Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.  
This was also the era in which the Court was most receptive to novel 
claims under the Due Process Clause, like those based on unduly 
suggestive eyewitness identification procedures. For example, in Foster v. 
California,
181
 the Court held that the Due Process Clause required the 
exclusion of an eyewitness identification that was the product of unduly 
suggestive police procedures, even though such procedures did not 
necessarily implicate any other more specific guarantee in the Constitution 
and did not necessarily “shock the conscience.” 
By the end of the decade—the “heyday” of the Warren Court—almost 
all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights had been incorporated.
182
 Each 
time the Court incorporated a new right that pertained to police 
investigatory practices and pretrial procedures, it also applied the 
exclusionary rule, generally citing the same rationale: that to hold 
otherwise would render the right meaningless because there would be no 
 
 
 175. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656–60 (1961). 
 176. Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217). 
 177. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 178. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 179. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 180. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
 181. 394 U.S. 440 (1969). Foster built on the Court’s prior identification decisions, including 
Stovall v. Denno, which recognized the possibility of a Due Process right to preclude identifications 
that were the product of unduly suggestive identification procedures. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 
293 (1967). 
 182. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3031–38 (2010); George C. Thomas III, The 
Criminal Procedure Road Not Taken: Due Process and the Protection of Innocence, 3 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 169, 171–74 (2005).  
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incentive for the police to honor it.
183
 The exclusionary rule applied not 
only to evidence obtained directly in contravention of one of the newly-
recognized rights, but also to any fruits thereof.
184
 In sum, the 1960s 
marked the zenith of the Court’s exercise of its constitutional and 
supervisory authority to exclude evidence. But it was a decade in which 
the Court showed little interest in revisiting entrapment. That bridge had 
been crossed, and the Court was busy with other pressing matters. In the 
decade that followed, the tone and content of the Court’s criminal 
procedure decisions would change, as a new Chief Justice, Warren Burger, 
took over from Earl Warren and the Court faced political backlash in the 
face of rising crime rates. Cases explicating the exclusionary rule would 
remain an important part of the Court’s criminal law docket, although the 
outcome of those cases would more often result in the recognition of an 
exception to the exclusionary rule than an extension of its application. It 
was in this decidedly more conservative era that the Court took up 
entrapment once again. 
B. The 1970s: The Exclusionary Rule in Retreat; Retrenchment in 
Entrapment Doctrine 
1. Developments in the Exclusionary Rule 
If the 1960s were the decade in which the Court took an expansive 
view of criminal defendants’ constitutional rights and of the exclusionary 
rule, the 1970s were the decade in which the Court assessed the 
consequences of what it had wrought and began to carve out exceptions. 
For example, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
185
 the Court recognized a 
consent exception to the requirement of a warrant before a search of a 
suspect’s home, such that evidence obtained pursuant to a consent search 
could be admitted at a defendant’s trial.186 The Court posited that the 
exception presupposed consent voluntarily given, but it had not previously 
addressed what voluntary meant in this context. The Court turned to its 
confessions jurisprudence for guidance, finding there its “most extensive 
 
 
 183. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)). 
 184. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (holding that an unlawful search or 
seizure required suppression of any physical evidence or statements unless the government could show 
that the evidence had been obtained “by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary 
taint”) (quotations omitted). 
 185. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 186. Id. at 248–49. 
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judicial exposition of the meaning of ‘voluntariness.’”187 That case law, in 
turn, articulated a concept of voluntariness that was very much a legal 
construct, designed to balance the needs of effective law enforcement with 
the desire to deter unwarranted intrusions on individual rights.
188
 It asked 
not what the defendant would have chosen to do absent the police request 
for consent or whether the defendant experienced some coercion from the 
police, but whether the consent was “the product of an essentially free and 
unconstrained choice by its maker[.]”189 That inquiry required taking into 
account the totality of the circumstances of the encounter and the 
defendant’s individual characteristics, such as age, education, and prior 
interactions with the criminal justice system.
190
 If the government, as the 
proponent of the evidence, persuaded a judge at a pretrial hearing that the 
consent was voluntarily given (assuming an initial showing by the 
defendant sufficient to trigger a hearing), the resulting evidence could be 
admitted at trial.  
Similarly, in Neil v. Biggers
191
 and Manson v. Brathwaite,
192
 the Court 
established a framework for the admissibility of eyewitness identifications 
that explicitly balanced the needs of effective law enforcement and reliable 
adjudications with the desire to deter police misconduct. Conceptually, the 
Court downgraded the due process right it had articulated in the prior 
decade’s identification cases to an “evidentiary interest.”193 In Biggers, the 
Court explained that “[i]t is the likelihood of misidentification which 
violates a defendant’s right to due process . . . . Suggestive confrontations 
are disapproved because they increase the likelihood of misidentification, 
and unnecessarily suggestive ones are condemned for the further reason 
that the increased chance of misidentification is gratuitous.”194 “Unlike a 
warrantless search,” the Manson Court noted, “a suggestive preindictment 
identification procedure does not in itself intrude upon a constitutionally 
protected interest.”195 Thus, the standard required of eyewitness 
identification evidence is “that of fairness as required by the Due Process 
 
 
 187. Id. at 223. 
 188. Id. at 224–25. 
 189. Id. at 225 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)) (emphasis added). 
 190. Id. at 226.  
 191. 409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
 192. 432 U.S. 98 (1977). 
 193. Id. at 113 n.14 (“[i]n essence what the Stovall due process right protects is an evidentiary 
interest. . . .”).  
 194. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198. 
 195. Manson, 432 U.S. at 113 n.13. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1016 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 91:979 
 
 
 
 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”196 If the identification was, in the 
end, sufficiently reliable, that standard of fairness was satisfied.
197
 
The Court articulated a two-part test to assess whether an identification 
met the Due Process fairness requirement. The first prong of the test 
focused on the police conduct and asked whether the pretrial identification 
procedure had been unduly and unnecessarily suggestive, taking into 
account all of the circumstances of the encounter.
198
 The second part of the 
test asked whether the witness’s identification was nevertheless reliable, 
again taking into account the totality of the circumstances, including the 
“opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the 
crime.”199 The Court refused to limit the test to only the first prong, an 
approach that the Court called a “per se” approach that had been adopted 
by several of the courts of appeals.
200
 Although the per se approach served 
the ends of deterrence, it went “too far since its application automatically 
and peremptorily, and without consideration of alleviating factors, keeps 
evidence from the jury that is reliable and relevant.”201 The Court reasoned 
that the totality approach also would serve as a deterrent to police 
misconduct because the police still would guard against unnecessarily 
 
 
 196. Id. at 113. 
 197. Manson’s emphasis on the reliability of a witness’ identification as the linchpin of 
admissibility led some to believe that the decision could be read as affording a defendant a due process 
right to exclude unreliable evidence, or at least unreliable eyewitness identifications, even if in the 
absence of suggestive conduct by law enforcement. In Perry v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court 
rejected that argument, holding that state action was a necessary condition for a due process challenge 
to an eyewitness identification. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012). The Court 
explained that a key premise of Manson and the cases that preceded it was that exclusion is necessary 
in certain circumstances “to deter law enforcement use of improper lineups, showups, and photo 
arrays.” Id. at 726. If no law enforcement personnel were involved in a pretrial identification, no 
deterrence purpose would be served by exclusion.  
 198. See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198. 
 199. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114. The other factors that the Court identified are the “witness’ degree 
of attention” at the time of the crime, “the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of 
certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation”— 
all to be measured against the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. Id. Many social scientists 
have since demonstrated that the Biggers/Manson factors are not necessarily correlated with the 
reliability of an identification, and recent scholarship has shown that mistaken identifications are a 
leading cause of wrongful convictions. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 
WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 45–83 (2011). Some courts now allow expert evidence 
on the fallibility of eyewitness identifications, give jury instructions about the fallibility of such 
evidence, and have altered the Manson framework for admissibility, citing their state constitutions or 
supervisory powers. See, e.g., State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011) (relying on supervisory 
powers and due process protections of New Jersey Constitution to require certain police procedures in 
conducting identification procedures and to alter the Manson framework for admissibility of 
identifications in New Jersey courts). Nevertheless, the Biggers/Manson framework still provides the 
governing test in federal court and in many state courts. 
 200. Manson, 432 U.S. at 110–11. 
 201. Id. at 112. 
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suggestive procedures for fear that their actions would lead to the 
exclusion of the evidence.
202
 But it would not preclude identifications 
(frequently the most important evidence in a case) where the identification 
could otherwise be shown to be reliable. Thus, under Biggers and Manson, 
a defendant challenging the admissibility of an identification first must 
demonstrate that the identification proceeding was unduly or unnecessarily 
suggestive. If such a showing is made, then the burden shifts to the 
government to demonstrate that the identification nevertheless was 
reliable.  
2. Developments in Entrapment 
The Supreme Court’s two decisions involving entrapment from the 
1970s reflect the Burger Court’s more conservative approach to criminal 
justice. Justice Rehnquist wrote both opinions for the Court. First, in 
United States v. Russell,
203
 the Court rejected the defendant’s invitation to 
revisit the Sorrells-Sherman framework for entrapment, describing 
Sorrells as “a precedent of long standing that has already been once 
reexamined in Sherman and implicitly there reaffirmed.”204 Russell argued 
that the “same factors that led [the] Court to apply the exclusionary rule” 
in Weeks,
205
 Mapp,
206
 and Miranda
207
 should counsel in favor of barring 
his prosecution, because the law enforcement methods used in his case 
(namely, the government agent’s provision to Russell of a key ingredient 
for manufacturing methamphetamine, the crime for which he subsequently 
was charged) violated “the fundamental principles of due process.”208 The 
Court found this argument unpersuasive, noting that, unlike those other 
cases, “the Government’s conduct here violated no independent 
constitutional right of the respondent.”209 But, recalling Rochin, the Court 
held out the possibility that it might “some day be presented with a 
situation . . . so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely 
bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a 
 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall dissented in two 
separate opinions, again urging that the Court adopt the objective test as articulated by the minority in 
Sorrells and Sherman. Id. at 438–39, 450. 
 204. Id. at 433. 
 205. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).  
 206.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 207.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
 208. Russell, 411 U.S. at 430. 
 209. Id. 
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conviction.”210 However, this was not that case. The Court held that the 
agent’s contribution of a legal chemical to a criminal enterprise already 
underway was “scarcely objectionable,”211 let alone outrageous. 
The Court decided Hampton v. United States
212
 just three years later. 
Hampton argued that the facts of his case (which involved a government 
agent on both sides of a narcotics transaction, one supplying Hampton 
with the narcotics and the other buying it from him) constituted precisely 
the type of outrageous government conduct that Russell suggested would 
violate the Due Process Clause.
213
 The Court held that the difference 
between the government’s conduct in Russell and Hampton was “one of 
degree, not of kind.”214 Writing for a plurality of the Court as to this issue, 
Justice Rehnquist went on to suggest that Russell was wrong to intimate 
that such a due process claim existed: 
The limitations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
come into play only when the Government activity in question 
violates some protected right of the defendant. . . . If the police 
engage in illegal activity in concert with a defendant beyond the 
scope of their duties the remedy lies, not in freeing the equally 
culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the police under the 
applicable provisions of state or federal law.
215
  
This particular passage cost Justice Rehnquist the votes of two members of 
the Court, Justices Powell and Blackmun, for his opinion. Although they 
concurred in the judgment of the Court, seeing no distinction between the 
facts of Russell and Hampton, they thought the foregoing language went 
too far in foreclosing the possibility that the Court might, in appropriate 
circumstances, utilize its supervisory authority over the courts or the Due 
Process Clause to bar a prosecution presenting more egregious facts.
216
 
Three members of the Court, Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall,
217
 
dissented, reprising their support for the objective test advocated in the 
minority opinions in Sorrells and Sherman.
218
 
 
 
 210. Id. at 431–32 (distinguishing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)). 
 211. Id. at 432. 
 212. 425 U.S. 484 (1976) 
 213. Id. at 489. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 490 (citations and quotations omitted). 
 216. Id. at 492–93 (Powell, J., concurring).  
 217. Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision in Hampton. Id. at 491. 
 218. Id. at 496 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
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In sum, entrapment doctrine emerged from the 1970s essentially 
unchanged, but with one new added feature: the possibility that the Due 
Process Clause might be the source of an independent limitation on the 
government’s use of undercover operations. Russell suggested that, where 
the government’s conduct was so outrageous as to shock the conscience, it 
would not matter whether a defendant was predisposed—the courts would 
not countenance such a prosecution. 
C. The 1980s: The Court Again Reaffirms the Sorrells-Sherman 
Framework for Entrapment and Expands the Exceptions to the 
Exclusionary Rule 
In the 1980s, the Court continued on the conservative trajectory charted 
by the Burger Court of the 1970s with respect to criminal justice and the 
exclusionary rule in particular.
219
 In Nix v. Williams,
220
 the Court adopted 
“the ultimate or inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary 
rule.”221 Then, in United States v. Leon,222 it adopted the “good faith” 
exception, holding that evidence need not be excluded if obtained in good 
faith reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant.
223
 In both 
contexts, the Court weighed the costs and benefits of recognizing the 
exceptions, much as it had in Schneckloth regarding consent searches and 
in Manson regarding eyewitness identifications.
224
 Finding in each case 
that the benefit in terms of deterring police misconduct was outweighed by 
the cost to the judicial system’s search for truth, the Court recognized the 
exception.
225
 In Nix, for example, the Court observed that allowing the 
government to use evidence derived from an unlawful search, seizure, or 
confession put the government in a better position that it would have been 
in had the defendant’s rights not been violated, thus encouraging such 
violations.
226
 But if the government could establish that it would have 
obtained the evidence from an independent, untainted source, suppression 
 
 
 219. See generally Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? 
Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466 (1996) (reviewing the ways in which the Burger 
Court cut back the application of the exclusionary rule). 
 220. 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
 221. Id. at 444. 
 222. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 223. Id. at 925–26. 
 224. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 225. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922; Nix, 467 U.S. at 443–44. During this same era, the Court also 
narrowed its view of standing to contest an unconstitutional search and expanded the government’s 
ability to use unconstitutionally obtained evidence for impeachment purposes. See Steiker, supra note 
219, at 2505–27. 
 226. Nix, 467 U.S. at 443. 
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put the government “in a worse position simply because of some earlier 
police error or misconduct.”227 Officers still would be deterred from 
engaging in unlawful behavior because generally they would not be in a 
position to know whether evidence inevitably would be discovered 
through independent means. If they did have reason to believe that the 
evidence could be obtained through independent means, their incentive 
would be to avoid “any questionable practice” lest the evidence be 
excluded as a consequence, or the officers face “departmental discipline 
and civil liability.”228 In Leon, the Court applied similar reasoning and 
held that the deterrent benefits of excluding evidence “obtained in 
objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search 
warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.”229 The Court 
noted that the exclusionary rule was a remedy, not a right in and of itself, 
and that “[a]s with any remedial device, the application of the rule has 
been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought 
most efficaciously served.”230  
The Court’s sole entrapment decision during this decade was Mathews 
v. United States.
231
 Handed down twelve years after Hampton, Mathews 
again left the Sorrells-Sherman framework intact, and clarified that a 
defendant need not concede all of the elements of an offense in order to 
receive a jury instruction on entrapment.
232
 Thus, a defendant could claim, 
for example, that he did not possess the requisite mens rea for the offense, 
but that, if the jury found that he did, he was entrapped. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court, asserting that, in the absence of 
any Congressional action on entrapment, the courts were left to decide 
what, if any, limitations should be placed on the availability of the 
defense.
233
 Beyond this relatively modest addition to entrapment doctrine, 
Mathews also signaled the official end to the ongoing debate on the Court 
over the proper test for entrapment: Justice Brennan wrote a brief 
concurrence accepting that the Court had “spoken definitively on this 
point” and that—notwithstanding his ongoing disagreement—the 
subjective test was now a matter of stare decisis.
234
 
 
 
 227. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 228. Id. at 445–46. 
 229. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.  
 230. Id. at 908 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). 
 231. 485 U.S. 58 (1988). 
 232. Id. at 62.  
 233. Id. at 66.  
 234. Id. at 66–67 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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D. Concluding Observations 
In the past three decades, the exclusionary rule has been further 
eroded.
235
 But the essential categories of pretrial suppression motions that 
courts routinely decide today are based on the Court’s decisions from the 
1960s through the 1980s. These motions typically include efforts to 
suppress evidence on account of a violation of Miranda, an unlawful 
search, or a suggestive identification. In deciding many of these motions, 
courts must evaluate the effect of police action on a particular individual, 
not a hypothetical reasonable person. The courts must determine whether 
the defendant’s action—e.g. his consent to speak or to search—was the 
product of inherent coercion or was instead “an essentially free and 
unconstrained choice by its maker[.]”236 They also frequently must answer 
a counterfactual question. For example, in the context of challenged 
eyewitness identification, the court must decide whether the witness would 
have been able to identify the defendant if he or she had not been exposed 
to law enforcement’s unduly suggestive tactics.237 In the context of 
evidence that is arguably tainted by an unlawful search or interrogation, 
the court must decide whether the police inevitably would have found the 
evidence through independent means.
238
 These questions are analytically 
similar to the predisposition question at the heart of the entrapment 
defense, which asks whether the defendant would have been willing to 
commit the offense absent government inducement. Like the exclusionary 
rule, the entrapment doctrine under the subjective test strikes a balance 
between the needs of effective law enforcement and individual rights. 
Aggressive police methods are not objectionable unless they overbear an 
individual’s will. And even methods that are deemed objectionable will 
not preclude a conviction if we are confident that the person would have 
 
 
 235. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) (tracing the Court’s trajectory 
away from automatic application of the exclusionary rule for every constitutional violation and holding 
that exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence seized when police conduct search in objectively 
reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) 
(exclusionary rule did not apply where officer reasonably believed there was an outstanding warrant 
for defendant’s arrest but officer’s belief was based on negligent bookkeeping error by another police 
employee); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (violation of “knock and announce” rule for 
executing search warrant did not require suppression of evidence); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 
(1995) (exclusionary rule did not apply where police reasonably relied on mistaken information in a 
court’s database that an arrest warrant was outstanding).  
 236. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1973) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 
367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)). 
 237. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).  
 238. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443–44 (1984). 
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committed the crime anyway—or at least would have been willing to do 
so as soon as an opportunity presented itself. 
In sum, the ways of thinking about police misconduct and its 
consequences that the Court developed in the 1970s and 1980s for 
purposes of applying the exclusionary rule grew to resemble the test for 
entrapment articulated in Sorrells and Sherman several decades earlier.
239
 
Yet, the two bodies of law inhabit different realms in our criminal justice 
system. The exclusionary rule, with its various exceptions, is administered 
by judges as part of their application of the rules of criminal procedure and 
evidence. Entrapment, notwithstanding its substantial similarities to the 
exclusionary rule’s balancing of interests and modes of analysis, is 
considered a doctrine of substantive criminal law. It is an affirmative 
defense that defeats culpability, which is decided by juries. Only its minor 
satellite, the Russell Due Process claim, is considered a procedural matter 
for the court to decide. No other substantive affirmative defense derives its 
rationale at least in part from the desire to deter police misconduct. This is 
what makes entrapment such an anomaly.  
III. THE 1990S TO THE PRESENT: DEVELOPMENTS IN ENTRAPMENT 
In the 1990s, the Court decided only one entrapment case, its final 
entrapment decision to date: Jacobson v. United States.
240
 Jacobson was 
the target of a twenty-six month sting operation conducted by various 
governmental agencies, who contacted Jacobson repeatedly through the 
mail to solicit his interest in pornography.
241
 Some of the mailings 
purported to be from organizations protesting government censorship of 
pornography. Others were questionnaires querying Jacobson’s sexual 
interests.
242
 When government agents finally sent Jacobson a catalogue of 
child pornography, he placed the order for the magazine that ultimately 
resulted in his conviction for receiving child pornography through the 
mail. Upon his arrest, police found no other child pornography in 
Jacobson’s home, except a single magazine that was lawful at the time it 
was purchased.
243
 The government offered no other evidence of 
 
 
 239. See supra Parts I.B–C. 
 240. 503 U.S. 540 (1992). 
 241. Id. at 542–48.  
 242. Id. The actions of the law enforcement personnel involved in the Jacobson case have long 
bewildered commentators, who question how and why so many resources were focused on Jacobson. 
For an interesting account, see Gabriel J. Chin, The Story of Jacobson: Catching Criminals or Creating 
Crime?, in CRIMINAL LAW STORIES 299 (Donna Coker & Robert Weisberg eds., 2013).  
 243. Id. at 547.  
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Jacobson’s prior receipt or possession of child pornography. Yet at trial, 
the jury rejected Jacobson’s claim of entrapment.244  
In a 5–4 decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction. Justice White wrote the opinion for the Court
245
 holding that 
Jacobson had been entrapped as a matter of law because the government 
had created his predisposition through its twenty-six month mail 
campaign. In the Court’s view, there was insufficient independent 
evidence that Jacobson was predisposed before the government’s 
investigation, or that his predisposition when he ordered the magazine 
could be disentangled from the government’s actions.246 The Court 
concluded: 
Law enforcement officials go too far when they implant in the mind 
of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense 
and induce its commission in order that they may prosecute. . . . 
When the Government's quest for convictions leads to the 
apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his 
own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law, the 
courts should intervene.
247
  
The dissenting members of the Court (in an opinion authored by Justice 
O’Connor and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, 
and Scalia) would have upheld the jury’s determination that Jacobson was 
predisposed. In their view, it was “the jury’s task, as the conscience of the 
community, to decide whether Mr. Jacobson was a willing participant in 
the criminal activity here or an innocent dupe.”248 Moreover, the dissenters 
disagreed with the majority as to the relevant point in time for measuring 
predisposition. It was, in their view, when the government first solicited 
the offense, not when its agents “came on the scene.”249 The dissenters 
worried that the Court’s refinement of the timing question would be 
interpreted as requiring a “reasonable suspicion” requirement before 
agents could initiate contact with a defendant.
250
  
 Notwithstanding the Jacobson dissenters’ fears, in the twenty years 
since Jacobson was decided, no federal court has held that Jacobson 
requires police to establish that they had reasonable suspicion before 
 
 
 244. Id. at 548.  
 245. Justice White’s opinion was joined by Blackmun, Stevens, Souter, and Thomas. 
 246. Id. at 550. 
 247. Id. at 553–54 (citations and quotations omitted). 
 248. Id. at 560–61. 
 249. Id. at 557. 
 250. Id.  
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initiating an undercover investigation of a target.
251
 However, Jacobson 
has had a significant impact on the point in time at which predisposition 
must be measured, with particular salience for today’s complex long-term 
investigations. Following Jacobson, courts have consistently held—and 
have altered their jury instructions to make clear—that the government 
must show that the defendant was predisposed before coming into contact 
with government agents, and must make this showing beyond a reasonable 
doubt.
252
 
Jacobson also has prompted a debate about whether the decision 
altered the meaning of “predisposition.” The vast majority of circuits have 
held that it did not, and that predisposition means simply that a defendant 
is mentally “ready and willing” to commit an offense if presented with an 
opportunity—the generally accepted understanding of predisposition prior 
to Jacobson.
253
 However, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in 
a 6–5 opinion for the en banc court written by Judge Posner, interpreted 
Jacobson as adding a “positional” readiness component to the 
predisposition test.
254
 In United States v. Hollingsworth, the Seventh 
Circuit held that predisposition requires a showing that a defendant is “so 
 
 
 251. Even though the courts have not embraced the idea, a number of commentators have argued 
that agents should be required to demonstrate probable cause to a neutral magistrate before initiating 
an undercover investigation. See MARCUS, supra note 11, §§ 8.04, 8.13–17; Maura F.J. Whelan, Lead 
Us Not Into (Unwarranted) Temptation: A Proposal to Replace the Entrapment Defense with a 
Reasonable-Suspicion Requirement, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1193 (1985). As a matter of internal policy, 
the F.B.I. does require that agents have reasonable suspicion before undertaking an undercover 
operation in most circumstances. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTY GEN.’S GUIDELINES ON FBI 
UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS (May 30, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/ 
undercover-fbi-operations.pdf. These internal guidelines do not, however, have the force of law. They 
also do not apply to cases involving threats to national security or foreign intelligence. See U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, THE ATTY GEN.’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS 31 (Sept. 29, 2008), 
available at www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf. Undercover operations involving 
religious or political organizations must be reviewed by FBI Headquarters with participation of the 
Department of Justice’s National Security Division. See id.  
 252. See, e.g., LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., 3–8 MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL 
¶ 8.07 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2008) (encouraging courts to instruct juries that “a defendant may not 
be convicted of a crime . . . if he was not ready and willing to commit the crime before the government 
officials or agents first spoke to him) (emphasis added). See also PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. CTS. OF THE FIRST CIR. 5.06 Cmt.1 (1997); United States v. Burt, 143 
F.3d 1215, 1218–19 (9th Cir. 1998) (reversing for failure to explicitly instruct jury on Jacobson’s 
timing element).  
 253. See, e.g., United States v. Ulloa, 882 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Although we have 
consistently approved the phrase ‘ready and willing’ as an appropriate definition of the requisite 
predisposition, we have never distinguished ‘readiness’ from ‘willingness.’ The focus of the 
entrapment inquiry, once inducement by the Government is established, is on the defendant’s state of 
mind.”) (citations omitted). 
 254. United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1200 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (noting 
predisposition “has positional as well as dispositional force”).  
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situated by reason of previous training or experience or occupation or 
acquaintances that it is likely that if the government had not induced him 
to commit the crime some criminal would have done so.”255 Reflecting the 
law-and-economics orientation of its author, Hollingsworth suggests that 
stings which trap positionally ready defendants create no new offenses, but 
merely “affect[] the timing” of offenses, and therefore constitute a 
legitimate use of law enforcement resources.
256
 But operations that 
generate new offenses by “exploiting the susceptibility of a weak-minded 
person” otherwise unlikely to offend represent a waste of scarce 
government resources.
257
 Notwithstanding the appeal of Hollingsworth’s 
introduction of a present dangerousness component to the predisposition 
test,
258
 most other circuits have held that Jacobson did not, in fact, work 
such a refinement of entrapment doctrine.
259
 Thus, in most of the United 
 
 
 255. Id. at 1200. The Seventh Circuit’s view that predisposition implies a positional readiness 
component grows out of the Jacobson Court’s observation that a non-predisposed defendant is “an 
otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the 
law.” Id. at 1199 (quoting Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553–54). The defendants in Hollingsworth were an 
Arkansas dentist and a farmer who owned a foreign banking license. They placed an advertisement in 
a newspaper offering to sell the license. Id. at 1200. A United States Customs agent answered the 
advertisement and proposed a number of unlawful financial transactions. Id. at 1200–01. The 
defendant with whom he spoke expressed reluctance and broke off contact. Id. at 1201. Five months 
later, the agent again reached out with the same proposition. This time, that defendant agreed and 
proceeded to engage in a number of money laundering transactions. Id. According to Judge Posner, 
writing for the en banc court, the defendants failed the predisposition test on the positional prong 
because, absent the efforts of the government agent, they were unlikely ever to be presented with the 
opportunity to engage in the crimes of which they were convicted. Id. at 1202. The court observed: “to 
get into the international money-laundering business you need underworld contacts, financial acumen 
or assets, access to foreign banks or bankers, or other assets. [The defendants] had none.” They were 
“objectively harmless,” unlikely if left to their own devices to run afoul of the law. Id. 
 256. Id. at 1203.  
 257. Id. (“The defense of entrapment reflects the view that the proper use of the criminal law in a 
society such as ours is to prevent harmful conduct for the protection of the law abiding, rather than to 
purify thoughts and perfect character.”). 
 258. See Paul Marcus, Presenting, Back From the [Almost] Dead, The Entrapment Defense, 47 
FLA. L. REV. 205 (1995) (embracing Hollingsworth’s readiness test); David D. Tawil, Note, “Ready? 
Induce. Sting!”: Arguing for the Government’s Burden of Proving Readiness in Entrapment Cases, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 2371 (2000) (same). 
 259. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 2 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 9.8 n.60 (2d ed. 2012) (noting that most other 
courts have not embraced the Hollingsworth “positional predisposition” inquiry). The Fifth Circuit 
briefly embraced the Hollingsworth test but promptly vacated that decision on rehearing en banc. See 
United States v. Knox, 112 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 1997), rehearing en banc granted in part, opinion 
vacated in part by United States v. Knox, 120 F.3d 42 (5th Cir. 1997) and on rehearing in part, United 
States v. Brace, 145 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 1998). Most recently, the Second Circuit rejected 
Hollingsworth’s positional readiness test. See United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 217 (2d Cir. 
2013) (“A person who has a pre-existing design to commit terrorist acts against United States interests 
or who promptly agrees to play a part in such activity should not escape punishment just because he 
was not in a position to obtain Stinger missiles and launch them at United States airplanes. The 
Government need not leave him at large until a real terrorist suggests such action and supplies real 
missiles.”). 
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States courts, predisposition refers solely to the defendant’s mental 
readiness to commit the crime.
260
 Consistent with the Court’s approach 
since Sorrells, in all of the Circuits the jury is entrusted with the decision 
as to whether the defendant was entrapped, with courts retaining the 
authority “to police the outer limits of the jury’s role by ruling in an 
extreme case, like Jacobson, that entrapment has been established as a 
matter of law.”261 Yet the reported cases suggest that juries generally reject 
claims of entrapment, even in cases where there is little or no evidence of 
a prior criminal design, and where government agents played a dominant 
role in planning and orchestrating the offense, including offering large 
sums of money.
262
 These verdicts are seldom overturned on appeal. The 
separate due process claim that Russell articulated also lives on, at least as 
a theoretical matter, as a basis for dismissal to be determined solely by the 
court. However, the bar for such a claim has been raised over time, with 
most courts suggesting that only conduct involving the infliction of pain or 
physical or psychological coercion would suffice.
263
 Although defendants 
 
 
 260. The model jury instructions in various circuits reflect this formulation. For example, the 
influential Modern Federal Jury Instructions authored by Southern District of New York Judges 
Leonard Sand and Jed Rakoff, among others, recommend instructing the jury as follows about the 
predisposition prong of entrapment: 
While the law permits government agents to trap an unwary criminally-minded person, the 
law does not permit the government agents to entrap an unwary innocent. Thus, a defendant 
may not be convicted of a crime if it was the government who gave the defendant the idea to 
commit the crime, if it was the government who also persuaded him to commit the crime, and 
if he was not ready and willing to commit the crime before the government officials or agents 
first spoke to him. . . . If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
predisposed, that is, ready and willing to commit the offenses charged, and merely was 
awaiting a favorable opportunity to commit them, then you should find that the defendant was 
not the victim of entrapment. On the other hand, if you have a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant would have committed the offenses charged without the government’s 
inducements, you must acquit the defendant. 
SAND ET AL., supra note 252, ¶ 8.07. Some of the Courts of Appeals have further refined their tests for 
predisposition, identifying particular methods of proving predisposition that will suffice. For example, 
the First Circuit has held that predisposition may be established by showing a defendant’s likely 
response to an “ordinary” inducement—i.e., one lacking those “special features of the government’s 
conduct” that may have made it improper and overreaching. United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 
962 (1st Cir. 1994). The Second Circuit has held that predisposition may be established by showing 
(1) an existing course of similar criminal conduct; (2) an already formed “design” to commit the crime 
or similar crimes; or (3) a willingness to commit the crime, as evidenced by ready response to the 
government’s inducement. See Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 227 (Dennis, C.J., dissenting); United States v. 
Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 191 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Brunshtein, 344 F.3d 91, 101–02 (2d Cir. 
2003). 
 261. Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 205 n.5.  
 262. See Sherman, supra note 24, at 1489–99 (discussing representative cases). 
 263. See, e.g., Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 221; United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 121 (2d Cir. 
2011); United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460, 1476–77 (D.C. Cir. 1983). But see United States v. 
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who claim entrapment under the Sorrells-Sherman framework often 
concurrently assert the Russell due process claim, to date there is only one 
reported case in which a court ruled for a defendant based on the Russell 
due process claim.
264
  
Thus, we are at the point where judicial administration of entrapment 
doctrine (through the decisions of juries and courts reviewing jury 
decisions on appeal) does not appear to be doing much work to sort among 
offenders whom the government has elected to charge. This is so even as 
members of the press and public, and even some judges, express concern 
that the government’s undercover operations are being abused.265 It is 
worth asking, then—since entrapment is the primary mechanism our 
judicial system has developed for policing undercover operations
266—
whether the courts might adjust their administration of the entrapment 
defense so as to make it more a more robust check, even without changing 
the content of the subjective test. 
IV. SEMI-PROCEDURALIZING ENTRAPMENT 
Recognizing that the entrapment defense reflects concerns sounding 
both in substantive criminal law and in criminal procedure (and 
understanding how, as a historical matter, entrapment wound up in the 
substantive criminal law category) points toward one possible 
modification of current practice: having courts make an initial pretrial 
ruling on claims of entrapment, much as they routinely rule pretrial on the 
 
 
Black, 733 F.3d 294 (9th Cir. 2013) (articulating a more liberal view of the due process outrageous 
government misconduct test but nevertheless finding that it was not met).  
 264. See United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978). For a discussion of Twigg and how 
most due process claims fail, see MARCUS, supra note 11, §§ 7.03–04. See also United States v. 
Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d 211, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 727 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2013) (rejecting 
outrageous government conduct due process claim in context of terrorism sting and noting that “Twigg 
is sui generis: it has never been followed, even in the Third Circuit . . . . The trajectory of the law is 
away from Twigg, not toward it”).  
 265. See, e.g., Black, 733 F.3d at 313–18 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (finding government’s conduct 
sufficiently outrageous to warrant dismissal of case); Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 227–30 (Jacobs, Chief J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding that defendant was entrapped as a matter of law and 
was “comically incompetent, possibly the last candidate one would pick as the agent of a conspiracy”); 
United States v. Cromitie, 2011 WL 1842219, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2011) (“There is not the 
slightest doubt in my mind that James Cromitie could never have dreamed up the scenario in which he 
actually became involved.”); United States v. Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d 211, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(rejecting claim of outrageous government misconduct but observing that “the Government appears to 
have done minimal due diligence”). See also supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text; MARCUS, 
supra note 11, § 10.06 (observing that courts have grown more concerned about government 
entanglement in crime).  
 266. See supra note 28. 
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admissibility of confessions, evidence obtained pursuant to a search, or 
identifications. For the reasons set forth below, there is reason to believe 
that such pretrial rulings would make the entrapment doctrine a more 
meaningful check on law enforcement action that it is now.  
Currently, in most federal courts, entrapment is submitted to the jury if 
a defendant raises the issue of government inducement by a preponderance 
of the evidence.
267
 Once submitted to the jury, the government bears the 
burden of proving that the defendant was predisposed beyond a reasonable 
doubt.
268
 A judge can direct an acquittal as a matter of law based on 
entrapment, if in the Court’s opinion no reasonable jury could find beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed. But assuming some 
evidence of predisposition is adduced, such judicial intervention is rare. 
And it should be, if entrapment is viewed solely as a question of 
substantive criminal law and culpability, which is traditionally the 
province of the jury. However, if entrapment is also viewed as a 
procedural and evidence law question, it opens the door to a pre-trial 
ruling by a different standard: the burden would be on the government to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was 
predisposed, just as prosecutors bear the burden of proving to a judge by a 
preponderance that a search, interrogation, or identification was lawful.
269
 
This is a subtle distinction, but it is meaningful.
270
 Prosecutors would have 
to persuade a judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
was predisposed to commit the offense prior to being approached by 
government agents, or else the case would not proceed to trial.  
The threshold showing that would be required to trigger pre-trial 
judicial review of the entrapment claim would have to be substantial—like 
 
 
 267. See MARCUS, supra note 11, § 6.02C (noting that, although the Supreme Court has never 
ruled definitively on the subject, the majority rule is to apply a preponderance standard); LAFAVE, 
supra note 62, at 546 (noting that most courts applying the majority, subjective test require defendant 
to come forward with “some evidence” or show government inducement by a preponderance of the 
evidence, at which point burden shifts to government to prove predisposition beyond a reasonable 
doubt).  
 268. See id. 
 269. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 3 CRIM. PROC. § 10.4(c) (3d ed. 2013); Colorado v. Connelly, 
479 U.S. 157 (1986); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 
(1972); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 n.5 (1984); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and 
Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REV. 271, 296 (1975).  
 270. See Michael D. Pepson & John N. Sharifi, Lego v. Twomey: The Improbable Relationship 
Between an Obscure Supreme Court Decision and Wrongful Convictions, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1185 
(2010) (discussing the significance of the standard of proof at suppression motions); Timothy J. 
Martens, Note, The Standard of Proof for Preliminary Questions of Fact Under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 119, 122 (1988); Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of 
Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1309–11 (1977) (collecting 
empirical work demonstrating the significance of different burdens of proof to decision-makers). 
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the first prong of the Manson framework, the entrapment inquiry would 
require a showing that the government’s conduct in inducing the offense 
was unduly suggestive. Here, the nature and extent of the government’s 
inducement would likely be highly relevant. A “market-rate” inducement 
in the context of an offense for which there is a readily-identifiable market 
rate generally would be unlikely to be deemed unduly suggestive.
271
 If a 
defendant established this first prong, then the burden would shift to the 
government to prove that the offense that the defendant committed in 
response to the inducement was nevertheless a reliable indicator of his 
predisposition. As courts now evaluate the various factors that inform the 
second prong of the Manson framework, they would take into account the 
various factors that bear on predisposition, including any relevant criminal 
history, the extent of the inducement, and the readiness of the defendant’s 
response. Only if the court were satisfied that the defendant was 
predisposed to commit the offense would the case go to the jury, much as 
courts must decide in advance whether an allegedly suggestive 
identification is nevertheless sufficiently reliable to be presented to the 
jury.  
This modification would focus the parties and the court on the 
entrapment issue, and the specific evidence bearing on it, at a significantly 
earlier stage in the proceedings than is presently the case. An important 
correlate would be that prosecutors would be required to provide 
discovery related to the entrapment issue, such as information about the 
defendants’ prior acts suggestive of predisposition, and information about 
an informant’s prior statements, payment, and criminal record, in 
conjunction with a pre-trial entrapment hearing—far earlier than such 
information normally would be provided.
272
 Not only would the gathering 
and disclosure of such information flag at an early stage any potential 
problems with the government’s case; it also would give a defendant a 
more meaningful opportunity to decide whether to plead guilty, or—if 
not—whether to pursue an entrapment defense at trial.  
Just as in the case of other pretrial evidentiary rulings, it is not clear 
that the Constitution or any other legal constraint requires that a judge, 
 
 
 271. Many scholars have advocated looking at “market rates” as part of the entrapment inquiry. 
See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 62. 
 272. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970) (in any criminal prosecution, a witness’s prior statements near 
not be produced prior to the witness’s direct testimony at trial). Under the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, a witness’s prior statement must be produced after a witness has testified on direct in 
connection with a motion to suppress evidence. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(a), 12(h).  
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rather than a jury, make this decision.
273
 But practical considerations—
chief among them the expense and waste of judicial resources associated 
with empanelling two different juries—strongly argue in favor of 
entrusting the decision to the trial judge. Moreover, on account of the 
Warren Court’s revolution in criminal procedure (and the Burger Court’s 
counterrevolution),
274
 federal judges are accustomed to analyzing the type 
of counterfactual question and the balancing of interests presented by the 
predisposition inquiry in other contexts, especially other types of 
suppression motions.
275
 Although juries routinely are asked to determine a 
defendant’s mental state at the time of an offense, empirical studies 
suggest that juries may have difficulty applying highly nuanced categories 
of mental states,
276
 of which predisposition surely is one.
277
 To ask juries 
to determine a defendant’s mental state at a prior point in time in addition 
to the defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense may be assigning 
the jury a task that is outside of its core competency.  
Given their Article III tenure, federal judges may also be less likely 
than jurors—who must face one another in the jury room and their 
communities afterwards—to be afraid to rule against the government in an 
unpopular case.
278
 Although the criminal jury traditionally has served as 
 
 
 273. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 391 n.19 (1964) (holding that states could, if they 
choose, have the voluntariness of a confession be determined by a jury rather than a judge, so long as a 
different jury would determine guilt if the first jury held that the confession was involuntary). Some 
commentators have argued that juries should be substituted for judges in making initial pretrial rulings 
on the suppression of evidence. See, e.g., George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Saving Rights 
from a Remedy: A Societal View of the Fourth Amendment, 73 B.U. L. REV. 147, 150 (1993) (arguing 
that juries should replace judges in deciding pre-trial motions to suppress under the Fourth 
Amendment); Meghan J. Ryan, Juries and the Criminal Constitution, 65 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2283393 (arguing for jury involvement in pretrial 
suppression motions under the Fourth Amendment because juries will be more competent than judges 
in determining whether an officer’s conduct has violated society’s reasonable expectation of privacy).  
 274. See Steiker, supra note 219. 
 275. Of course, judges also answer counterfactual questions in a number of other contexts, 
including when reviewing convictions for harmless error or prejudice in a number of contexts.  
 276. See, e.g., Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306 (2011); Kevin 
Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Rea, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 317 (2009). 
 277. See United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 208–09 (2d Cir. 2013) (discussing complexity 
of predisposition as a mental state).  
 278. Although scholars have questioned for years whether judges sitting as triers of fact are in fact 
better able to disregard inadmissible evidence than are juries, our entire evidentiary system, including 
the exclusionary rule, is predicated on an assumption that judges are able to make such independent 
judgments. A recent set of experiments found that “evidence obtained in violation of constitutional 
rights [is] the one category in which judges actually could reliably and deliberately disregard 
inadmissible information.” Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L.J. 281, 331 
(2013) (referencing Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Admissible Information? The 
Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005)). 
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the “‘defense against arbitrary law enforcement,’”279 there is a compelling 
argument that entrapment, especially in highly sensational cases like those 
involving terrorism, is different and that the jury may not be the entity best 
suited to its application.
280
 Indeed, studies have shown that most members 
of the public do not see entrapment as negating culpability, but instead 
would prefer to see it treated as a mitigating factor at sentencing.
281
  
And in cases where the defense of entrapment is raised in the 
alternative to a claim that the defendant did not commit the offense—as, 
for example, in the complex terrorism conspiracy cases of recent years 
where there may be a real dispute about whether a defendant joined a 
conspiracy—there are additional reasons to be concerned about the ability 
of the jury to render a fair verdict on guilt when it is simultaneously 
presented with the evidence that bears primarily on predisposition.
282
 This 
 
 
 279. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 561 (1992) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).  
 280. At least one other commentator has made a similar observation. See Laura Gardner Webster, 
Building a Better Mousetrap: Reconstructing Federal Entrapment Theory from Sorrells to Mathews, 
32 ARIZ. L. REV. 605, 639–40 (1990) (arguing that juries are not well suited to decide entrapment 
because of their majoritarian tendencies and their inability to “recognize and express the values which 
are compromised by police overreaching”). Others have argued that, in general, the notion of juries as 
the bulwark against arbitrary or overzealous government is outdated, and that “in modern times neither 
criminal law doctrine nor criminal justice practices allow juries to function effectively in that role.” 
Douglas A. Berman, Should Juries Be The Guide for Adventures Through Apprendi-Land, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 65, 67 (2009). See also Kate Stith-Cabranes, The Criminal Jury in Our 
Time, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 133, 139 (1995) ( (tracing shrinking authority of criminal juries, as 
“courts increasingly distinguished between issues of law and issues of fact and sought greater certainty 
in the application of the law”).  
 281. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY 
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 152–55 (1995). See also Roach, supra note 35, at 1460–68 
(explaining that entrapment is treated as a mitigating issue in sentencing in other countries).  
 282. When juries are simultaneously presented with evidence bearing on guilt and 
predisposition—and are simultaneously asked to decide both issues—there may be a tendency to 
conflate the one with the other. See Kevin A. Smith, Note, Psychology, Factfinding, and Entrapment, 
103 MICH. L. REV. 759, 775–79 (2005) (raising concern that jurors will infer predisposition from 
defendant’s commission of the offense); McAdams, supra note 20, at 181 (discussing the phenomenon 
of hindsight bias and the likelihood that, if a defendant accepts an inducement and commits an offense, 
“fact-finders will tend to over-attribute that behavior to the person’s willingness to offend rather than 
the undercover temptation”). Recognizing this problem, courts could give specific instructions alerting 
jurors to the phenomenon of hindsight bias. But this seems like the kind of instruction that may not be 
a sufficient remedy for the problem it seeks to address. In a number of other contexts, we acknowledge 
the human limitations of the jury and the ineffectiveness of limiting instructions. See, e.g., Bruton v. 
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (requiring at a joint trial that one defendant’s confession, if facially 
incriminating of the other defendant, either be excluded or redacted); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 
(1964) (requiring that voluntariness of defendant’s confession be determined prior to trial); see also 
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (district court abused its discretion under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 403 in admitting evidence of a defendant’s prior conviction). If the jury’s likely inability 
to follow instructions to disregard evidence, or consider it for a limited purpose, would result in an 
outcome that is unacceptable, we ought to consider alternatives, including removing the evidence from 
the jury’s consideration. See David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 
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is especially so in the context of long-term terrorism investigations, where 
such evidence may include not only a defendant’s prior crimes, but also 
religious affiliation and political ideology.
283
 In such cases, the actus reus 
of the offense—usually conspiracy—is already quite amorphous, making 
the question of predisposition even harder to separate from the defendant’s 
commission of the crime itself. (What does it mean to be predisposed to 
agree to provide material support to a terrorist organization?) Moreover, in 
such cases, identifying the moment of first government contact with a 
defendant (as contrasted with the moment of solicitation), as Jacobson 
requires, is frequently difficult.
284
 Finally, by issuing decisions that are 
specific to the entrapment question, judges can help build a body of law 
that may provide more useful guidance and more meaningful constraints 
for law enforcement than general jury verdicts.
285
   
All of these are compelling reasons to incorporate a pretrial ruling by 
the trial judge on entrapment—not necessarily as a substitute for a jury 
decision at the conclusion of the case, but as a screening mechanism that, 
in appropriate cases, could prevent the case from going to the jury at all. 
This is similar to the approach that courts have followed for decades in the 
context of confessions, searches, and identifications. The rationale for such 
a pretrial ruling would be the same as that for eyewitness identifications—
i.e., that a defendant has a due process interest, inherent in the Due Process 
Clause’s guarantee of basic fairness, that places limits on how the 
government can go about collecting evidence to be used in a criminal 
 
 
STAN. L. REV. 407, 446 (2013) (arguing in favor of a “context-specific weighing of the likelihood that 
an evidentiary instruction will work and the costs of it failing”). The remedy suggested here is a belt-
and-suspenders approach: use careful limiting instructions, but also require a pretrial decision by the 
trial judge.  
 283. See Sherman, supra note 24, at 1504–07. 
 284. For example, in Cromitie, the confidential informant first met one of the defendants at his 
mosque approximately three months before the FBI opened a formal investigation, and four months 
before the FBI started recording their conversations. During that time, the defendant and the informant 
had approximately five unrecorded meetings. The sting then continued for another eighteen months, 
until the defendants were arrested after placing “bombs” at a synagogue. See United States v. 
Cromitie, 781 F. Supp. 2d 211, 215–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). In United States v. Lakhani, the informant’s 
encounters with the defendant, who ultimately was convicted of attempting to provide material support 
to terrorists, brokering unlawful arms sales, and other charges, spanned nearly two years. See United 
States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2007). In United States v. Al-Moayad, the informant knew the 
defendant in Yemen for six years prior to becoming a confidential informant for the FBI. See United 
States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 285. See Webster, supra note 280, at 641. Some commentators have suggested that this concern is 
overblown, in that the very fact-bound nature of any such decision will prevent the courts from 
developing consistent rules. See, e.g., Park, supra note 100, at 269. Others have argued in other related 
contexts that consistency, even if it could be achieved, is less important than just adjudication, which a 
jury is more likely to achieve. See Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil 
and Criminal Juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 723, 735 (1993). 
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prosecution. Thus, a defendant would have a cognizable due process 
interest in excluding evidence obtained via entrapment only where he was 
induced to commit a crime by government agents.
286
 Had the Supreme 
Court first considered entrapment a few decades later than it did, this 
might well be the approach we already would have today.  
CONCLUSION 
For over eighty years, federal courts have characterized entrapment as a 
matter of substantive criminal law rather than criminal procedure. But it 
has never been an easy fit. Because the entrapment defense is available 
only when government agents cause a person to engage in criminal 
conduct, it feels like a question of procedure rather than substance, 
analogous to whether government agents abided by the rules in conducting 
a search or interrogation. In point of fact, entrapment wound up in the 
substantive criminal law category largely by historical happenstance, on 
account of when the Supreme Court first considered the defense. The 
Supreme Court placed it there in Sorrells in 1932 as a consequence of the 
Court’s decision to ground the doctrine in its interpretation of the 
Prohibition Act. Because the Court construed the statute as containing an 
implied exception, it assumed that a defense based on the application of 
the exception was in the nature of an affirmative defense to guilt. And 
affirmative defenses have traditionally been submitted to the jury.  
Over time, the Sorrells view of entrapment became fixed as a matter of 
stare decisis. This remained so even as the Court developed its 
exclusionary rule jurisprudence for violations of defendants’ criminal 
procedural rights, which came to resemble the test for predisposition the 
Court had developed in terms of its animating concerns and modes of 
analysis. Like the exclusionary rule, entrapment reflects an 
accommodation between two competing interests—on the one hand, a 
recognition of the need “for the effective enforcement of criminal laws,” 
and, on the other, “society’s deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot 
be used as an instrument of unfairness.”287  
Appreciating the similarities between the Court’s entrapment doctrine 
and its exclusionary rule jurisprudence opens the door to a pre-trial 
judicial ruling on claims of entrapment. In the absence of any 
 
 
 286. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (explaining that the Due Process Clause 
gives individuals protections against efforts by law enforcement to collect evidence that do not apply 
to private actors). 
 287. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973). 
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Congressional action on entrapment—and to date there still has been 
none—the courts are left to decide what, if any, limits and procedural rules 
should apply to the administration of the entrapment defense.
288
 Now that 
we are in our second post-9/11 decade, with undercover operations as 
critical as ever but the legitimacy of such operations being called into 
question, it is important that the entrapment defense have a firm theoretical 
foundation and that it be implemented effectively. Recognizing 
entrapment’s anomalous nature—partly a doctrine of substantive criminal 
law and partly a doctrine of criminal procedure—can help get us there. 
 
 
 288. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 66 (1988). See also Fred Warren Bennett, From 
Sorrells to Jacobson: Reflections on Six Decades of Entrapment Law, and Related Defenses, in 
Federal Court, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 829, 846 (1992) (“Because of its longstanding 
preoccupation with the fundamental substantive nature of the defense, the Supreme Court has had little 
to say about entrapment’s procedural incidents.”) (emphasis omitted). 
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